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In recent years, the Supreme Court has narrowed or eliminated private 
rights of action in many legal regimes, much to the chagrin of the legal 
academy.  That trend, although certainly not limited to health law, has had a 
significant impact on the field; the Court’s decisions have eliminated the 
private enforcement mechanism for at least three important healthcare 
regimes: Medicaid, employer-sponsored insurance, and medical devices.  In a 
similar trend outside the courts, state legislatures have capped non-economic 
and punitive damages for medical malpractice litigation, weakening the tort 
system’s deterrent capacity in those states.  This Article suggests that the trend 
of eliminating private rights of action should be evaluated not as an 
elimination of legal enforcement (and creation of a “regulatory vacuum”) but 
rather as a shift of regulatory authority from state judicial forums to federal 
executive forums.  The Article then argues that such a shift might be a wise one 
for healthcare, given the particular market failures that justify the regulatory 
intervention.  In all four stories, federal executive regulators are poised to take 
over the regulatory job, and federal executive regulators have the capacity to 
do a better job than courts.  The Article therefore urges completion rather than 
reversal of the reallocation – a consolidation of regulatory authority in the 
federal executive and a further disarming of state judicial enforcement power. 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following scenarios:  
" A state Medicaid agency refuses to pay its doctors at the 
reimbursement rate required by federal statute.1 
" An employer-sponsored health insurer refuses to cover medically 
necessary services that ought to be covered under the insurance 
contract.2 
" A medical device manufacturer refuses to pull from the market – or 
to add warnings to the label of – an FDA-approved product that has 
injured patients.3 
 
1 See Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and 
Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 415-18 (2008); Abigail R. Moncrieff, 
Comment, Payments to Medicaid Doctors: Interpreting the “Equal Access” Provision, 73 
U. CHI. L. REV. 673, 673 (2006). 
2 See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204-05 (2004). 
3 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 319-21 (2008); Catherine T. Struve, The 
Food and Drug Administration and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, 
Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 587, 588 
(2005) (explaining how in recent years, because “policymakers have stressed the need to 
bring innovative medical treatments to market,” greater deference is paid to FDA’s product 
  
2010] COURT’S ASSAULT ON PRIVATE HEALTH LITIGATION 2325 
 
" A doctor refuses to take cost-justified precautions against injuring 
patients.4 
How can the legal system bring these actors into compliance with the law? 
Since the country’s founding, the predominant answer in the United States 
has been that individuals harmed by such violations could sue wrongdoers not 
only for individual compensation but also for systemic deterrence.  That is, the 
American legal system has largely relied on private litigation – primarily 
brought under common law theories in state courts – to deter wrongdoing 
through punitive damages or court-ordered regulatory change.  In the last few 
decades, however, the Supreme Court has, in a wide range of regulatory 
regimes, curbed individuals’ and courts’ ability to play that role. 
This change, although certainly not limited to healthcare law,5 has been 
significant for healthcare regulation.  With three Supreme Court cases and one 
widely-enacted state statutory reform, the private enforcement model has 
disappeared from at least four important realms of healthcare law – the four 
alluded to in the stories above.  First, Medicaid.  In Gonzaga University v. Doe, 
the Supreme Court narrowed the availability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for enforcing 
federal statutes, especially those enacted under Congress’s spending power.6  
That holding, as applied in the lower courts, has made it impossible for 
individuals to sue state agencies (or, more precisely, the heads of the agencies) 
for certain violations of the federal Medicaid Act, including violations of the 
essential “Equal Access Provision” that governs provider reimbursement.7  
Second, employer-sponsored insurance (ESI).  In Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 
the Court gave a broad reading and application to the preemption provision of 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).8  That 
holding, combined with the Court’s narrow reading of ERISA’s remedial 
provision, has made it impossible for some patients to hold their insurers 
accountable for injuries resulting from wrongful benefits denials.9  Third, 
 
approval). 
4 See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs: The Need for National Action in 
Medical Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 844, 855-61 (2009) (reviewing the 
literature on medical malpractice reform). 
5 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors to Civil Rights Litigants, 5 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 537, 537-39 (2003) (listing a long line of Rehnquist Court decisions that 
prevent individuals from suing to enforce civil rights). 
6 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 273 (2002). 
7 See Huberfeld, supra note 1, at 445-51 (observing that federal appellate courts have 
applied Gonzaga to limit or prohibit claims against state Medicaid agencies and predicting 
that the Roberts Court will further limit such claims). 
8 Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004) (holding that ERISA preempts 
state laws that would have provided causes of action against insurance companies denying 
benefits under “medical necessity” clauses). 
9 See id. at 221 n.7 (reserving the question of whether one of ERISA’s remedial 
provisions, § 502(a)(3), might allow for consequential or punitive damages); Great-West 
Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209-18 (2002) (interpreting § 502(a)(3) 
  
2326 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90: 2323 
 
medical devices.  In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the Court held that Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) pre-market approval of the riskiest (“Class III”) 
medical devices preempts state tort suits challenging those products’ safety and 
labeling.10  Because there is no federal cause of action to replace preempted 
state laws, that holding has made it impossible for patients to sue 
manufacturers for injuries resulting from unsafe devices.  Finally, medical 
error.  In a similar trend outside the Court, several state legislatures have 
capped non-economic and punitive damages in medical malpractice litigation, 
limiting their own tort systems’ capacity to deter iatrogenic (i.e., physician-
caused) injuries.  Of course, medical malpractice litigation still serves 
compensatory purposes in those states, but caps limit the tort system’s 
regulatory capacity.11 
Healthcare regulation has thus lost several of its private enforcement 
mechanisms over the past decade, largely to the chagrin of the legal 
academy.12  But should those losses actually worry us?  Is it problematic that 
 
extremely narrowly); Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
Court’s “encompassing interpretation of ERISA’s preemptive force” coupled with its 
“cramped construction of the ‘equitable relief’ allowable under § 502(a)(3)” creates a 
“‘regulatory vacuum’” in which no remedy exists (citations omitted)); David A. Hyman, 
Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong with a Patient Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 
221, 229 (2000) (explaining that ERISA, while preempting state-law remedies, “contains no 
substantive regulation of its own, and provides only an exceedingly limited set of 
remedies”). 
10 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc, 552 U.S. 312, 312-13 (2008). 
11 Granted, the tort system probably wasn’t doing a good job at deterring iatrogenic 
injury before the caps.  See INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH 
SYSTEM 1 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) (summarizing statistical evidence that suggests 
that the frequency of iatrogenic deaths in U.S. hospitals is much higher than commonly 
believed).  But caps certainly decrease the system’s potential for that kind of regulation. 
12 For representative examples of scholarly chagrin at the curbing of private enforcement 
in each of the four stories described here, see TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
MYTH 1 (2005) (arguing that attempts to limit medical malpractice litigation are 
fundamentally misguided); David Brennan, Federal Preemption of All State Law Tort 
Claims in Riegel v. Medtronic: A Need to Undo a Serious Wrong, 36 W. ST. U. L. REV. 137, 
165-66 (2008) (“Consumer organizations and groups were quick to realize that users of 
Class III medical devices had been effectively disenfranchised from any reasonable remedy 
for dangerous or defective devices by a sweeping doctrine of federal preemption doctrine.”); 
Margaret Cyr-Provost, Aetna v. Davila: From Patient-Centered Care to Plan-Centered 
Care, a Signpost or the End of the Road?, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 171, 179 (2005) 
(descrying the fact that today’s legal climate lacks “legal and moral accountability” and 
leaves health care consumers without recourse); Huberfeld, supra note 1, at 414 (urging 
“legislative responses to the possible demise of the Medicaid entitlement”); Mark Andrew 
Ison, Note, Two Wrongs Don’t Make a Right: Medicaid, Section 1983 and the Cost of an 
Enforceable Right to Healthcare, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1479, 1516-18 (2003) (highlighting the 
potentially “catastrophic” harms to beneficiaries that might result from under-enforcement 
after Gonzaga); Theodore W. Ruger, The United State Supreme Court and Health Law: The 
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private litigation is no longer an option for enforcing federal Medicaid rules, 
contractual insurance provisions, or common law safety standards? 
The answer to that question ought to depend on the existence and nature of 
alternatives to private litigation.13  If market forces or administrative 
enforcement works as well as or better than private litigation, then we ought to 
embrace rather than resist the Court’s assault on private actions.  In that case, 
private actions might inefficiently replicate regulatory deterrence. 
This premise is neither new nor radical; scholars of law and economics have 
long recognized that common law and administrative law are substitutes, such 
that a rising administrative state justifies and even necessitates diminishment 
of common law remedies.14  But this premise and mode of analysis is one that 
the health law literature has largely overlooked in considering the Supreme 
Court’s recent holdings.  This Article fills that analytic void, asking not 
whether the curbing of healthcare litigation is bad in itself but whether the 
curbing of that litigation is bad given the broader regulatory environment for 
healthcare and given the particular regulatory needs that healthcare markets 
present.  That is, I ask and answer the comparative question: whether litigation 
is better or worse at setting incentives than its available substitute, 
administrative regulation. 
An important first step in answering the comparative question is to note that, 
in all four stories considered here, administrative regulators already exist and 
are already authorized to regulate.  For Medicaid, the federal Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) already has the authority to enforce 
federal standards against state agencies.  For ESI, the Department of Labor 
(DOL) (as well as a handful of other agencies since the passage of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)15) already has authority to 
 
Year in Review: The Supreme Court Federalizes Managed Care Liability, 32 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 528, 529 (2004) (“ERISA’s remedial provisions are so penurious that Aetna’s 
holding of complete preemption produces a legal regime that vastly under-compensates plan 
members who suffer a wrongful denial of care.”).    
13 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 383-84 (6th ed. 2003) 
(outlining circumstances in which we ought to prefer common law to administrative 
regulation and vice versa). 
14 For a recent elaboration of this point, see Kyle D. Logue, Coordinating Sanctions in 
Tort (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 
105, July 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430596. 
15 The Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA), an agency of the Department 
of Labor, is primarily responsible for administering the provisions of ERISA.  The 
enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and the Health Care 
and Education Reconciliation Act, signed into law in March 2010, made some significant 
changes to the regulatory structure for employer-sponsored insurance.  In particular, EBSA 
now shares “interpretive jurisdiction” with the Department of Treasury and the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) over PPACA provisions applicable to employer-
sponsored insurance.  EBSA Unified Agenda, Regulations Implementing the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), available at http://www.dol.gov/ 
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govern employer-provided healthcare plans, including authority to regulate 
administrators’ claims processing.  For medical devices, FDA already has 
authority to monitor approved devices and to require manufacturers to change 
safety labels or to pull unsafe products.  For medical error, CMS already has 
authority to serve a regulatory role by changing Medicare and Medicaid quality 
rules or by establishing an administrative adjudication system for medical 
injuries,16 and professional associations already have authority to serve a 
regulatory role by changing minimum quality standards for medical licensure.   
Why, then, have so many commentators complained of “regulatory 
vacuums” left in the wake of the Supreme Court’s holdings?  The current 
regulatory environment does not lack authoritative figures, and the existing 
authoritative figures do not lack legal tools for regulation.17  The regulatory 
space, then, is not at all vacuous, despite the abolition of private rights of 
action; federal executive agencies are well equipped to engage in the 
regulatory project, even though individuals and courts are no longer allowed to 
pursue it.   
These anxious commentators, though, are not completely off-base; they are 
simply over-stating the problem.  The problem today is not a lack of regulatory 
presence but rather a lack of regulatory rigor.  The existing administrative 
regulators simply don’t do the jobs that the Supreme Court and state 
legislatures have left for them: CMS hardly ever withdraws funding from or 
refuses approval to state Medicaid plans that violate federal standards;18 DOL 
 
ebsa/regs/unifiedagenda/spring-2010/1210-AB41.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).  The 
EBSA Unified Agenda states that the three departments “are proceeding concurrently to 
provide regulatory guidance regarding [implementation of PPACA] provisions.”  Id.  Thus, 
the agencies will jointly issue interpretations of relevant PPACA provisions.  Id.  According 
to EBSA, initial regulatory action will likely require insurers to extend dependent coverage 
and cover preventive health services without cost sharing and address PPACA provisions 
that prohibit insurers from establishing lifetime or annual limits on benefits, rescinding 
health coverage after coverage begins, excluding potential beneficiaries based on pre-
existing conditions and health status, and discriminating in favor of highly compensated 
individuals.  Id.  PPACA also imposes requirements on internal claims appeal and external 
review procedures that are applicable to group health plans.  See infra note 86 and 
accompanying text. 
16 Eleanor Kinney and Bill Sage have already proposed at least a limited version of this 
idea, arguing that CMS should adjudicate malpractice claims brought by Medicare and 
Medicaid beneficiaries.  See Eleanor D. Kinney & William M. Sage, Dances with 
Elephants: Administrative Resolution of Medical Injury Claims by Medicare Beneficiaries, 
5 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 2 (2008); Eleanor D. Kinney & William M. Sage, Resolving 
Medical Malpractice Claims in the Medicare Program: Can It Be Done?, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 
77, 90 (2005-2006); William M. Sage, The Role of Medicare in Medical Malpractice 
Reform, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 217, 225-28 (2006). 
17 That said, the relevant administrative agencies do not have sufficient financial 
resources to engage in the projects that I urge here.  That is, they have legal tools but lack 
practical resources.  For more on this point, see infra Part IV.B.3. 
18 Jon Donenberg, Medicaid and Beneficiary Enforcement: Maintaining State 
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neither provides an administrative system for claims review nor punishes 
abusive MCOs; FDA rarely monitors the safety of devices that have gone 
through pre-market approval and have entered the market; and neither CMS 
nor professional medical associations actively enforce quality standards for 
practicing providers.19  In short, to the extent that the executive already 
regulates these fields, it does far too little to make up for a lack of parallel 
private enforcement.  For now, thus, the Supreme Court and state legislatures 
have left health law not so much with regulatory vacuums as with enforcement 
vacuums, within which Medicaid agencies, employer-sponsored insurers, 
device manufacturers, and sloppy doctors can shirk legal obligations with 
relative impunity – all despite the existence of a robust regulatory structure. 
Unlike a true regulatory vacuum, an enforcement vacuum does not strongly 
suggest that the best solution is to restore the status quo ante, re-establishing 
private rights of action (the solution that most scholars have advocated so far).  
Instead, the enforcement vacuum presents a choice between two clear and easy 
alternatives: (1) re-empowering the enforcement mechanism that was working 
before (private litigation) or (2) motivating (and funding) the enforcement 
mechanisms that are not yet working today (administrative regulation).   
This Article urges the latter approach, primarily for reasons of comparative 
institutional competence.  The federal agencies have greater capacity to 
regulate well than courts and juries. 
The Supreme Court’s and state legislatures’ assaults on litigation, if 
understood as a vote of confidence for administrative regulators over common 
law and other judicial regulators, can be understood to embody a growing 
skepticism towards state judicial forums and an emerging trust in national 
executive forums for creating and enforcing healthcare rules.  Each story 
considered here suggests a straightforward reallocation of regulatory 
responsibilities from the judiciary to the executive as well as a less-
straightforward-but-nevertheless-real reallocation of regulatory responsibilities 
between the state and federal governments.  (In the stories of employer-
sponsored insurance and drug and device manufacturers, the federalist 
reallocation is a simple shift from state to national governance; in the Medicaid 
and medical malpractice stories, the federalist reallocation is more muddled, 
but like the others, these stories involve a shift of authority away from state 
forums.) 
Particularly in healthcare, this balance of skepticism towards judicial and 
state forums and trust in executive and national forums may be well-founded.  
 
Compliance with Federal Availability Requirements, 117 YALE L.J. 1498, 1501 (2008) 
(finding that CMS’s withdrawal power is “rarely, if ever, invoked” (quoting Lisa E. Key, 
Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under § 1983: The Supreme Court’s 
Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 293 
(1996))).  
19 For discussion of CMS’s growing interest in quality regulation, particularly including 
its “never events” and “pay for performance” policies, see infra Part II.A.4. 
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As we have long recognized, generalist juries and judges are bad at 
understanding, evaluating, and creating healthcare regulations20 – and expert 
agencies might be much better.21  Furthermore, federal regulation of healthcare 
might make more sense than state regulation for a variety of reasons, especially 
considering the economies of scale that we gain from operating nation-wide.22 
The shift from state courts to federal agencies therefore seems a wise shift, 
such that the mere re-creation of private rights of action – the rejection of this 
reallocative trend – does not seem the best solution to our current enforcement 
vacuums.  Instead, we should embrace the reallocations, and the federal 
executive bodies that are poised to regulate should start doing the jobs that the 
Supreme Court and state legislatures have left to them.  Fulfilling this shift will 
probably require some restructuring of administrative bodies and will certainly 
require additional funding for the federal regulators, but the move should not 
require substantive amendment of the regulatory statutes. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I fleshes out the four stories identified 
here, noting the assaults on litigation and the curbing of private rights of action 
in the four exemplar healthcare regimes.  Part II fleshes out the problem of 
enforcement vacuums, identifying the entity in each story that could regulate in 
the absence of litigation, noting that those entities have not yet stepped in to fill 
the regulatory role, and identifying the market failures that persist in the 
absence of regulation.  Part III fleshes out the judicial-to-executive and state-
 
20 See Lawrence Gostin, The Formulation of Health Policy by the Three Branches of 
Government, in SOCIETY’S CHOICES: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN 
BIOMEDICINE 335, 339-40 (Ruth Ellen Bulger et al. eds., 1995) (describing the limits of 
courts in healthcare policymaking); William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh, Introduction to  
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 4 (William M. Sage & Rogan 
Kersh eds., 2006) (outlining potential changes to the medical malpractice litigation process 
which could substantially increase the “accuracy and consistency of outcomes”); NEIL 
VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY 3-6 (1995) (reviewing criticism 
of juries by American Medical Association and others); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second 
Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 319-
20, 332-33 (1985) (arguing that juries are institutionally unable to make risk choices and 
that decisions should be made by regulatory agencies); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, 
and Patent Cases – An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 370 
(2000) (“[P]opular perceptions of juror incompetence and bias have caused commentators to 
argue that the role of the jury in patent litigation should be severely limited, and many 
alternatives have been proposed.”); David M. Studdert & Michelle M. Mello, When Tort 
Resolutions Are “Wrong”: Predictors of Discordant Outcomes in Medical Malpractice 
Litigation, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S47, S48-52 (2007).  But see VIDMAR, supra, at 161-82 
(arguing that juries are competent and that medical malpractice liability system is generally 
sound). 
21 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Law and Administrative Law: A Marriage Most 
Convenient, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 16-30 (2004) (describing the executive’s comparative 
advantages over both the judiciary and the market for regulating healthcare); Huber, supra 
note 20, at 285, 307-26. 
22 See Moncrieff, supra note 4, at 848. 
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to-federal reallocation trends that each story represents and discusses the 
reasons that we might like those trends for health law.  Part IV identifies the 
range of possible solutions for filling enforcement vacuums and argues that our 
general preference should be for federal executive regulation, even to the full 
exclusion of state judicial regulation.   
I. THE ASSAULT ON LITIGATION 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has closed courthouse doors to many 
litigants, particularly those alleging generalized statutory violations or 
otherwise attempting to use the court system for systemic regulation.23  This 
trend has affected a wide range of regulatory regimes, including disabilities 
law,24 employment and labor law,25 and civil rights law.26  It has also had a 
significant impact on health law.  The Court’s recent jurisprudence has 
disarmed private litigation for Medicaid enforcement, employer-sponsored 
insurance regulation, and medical device regulation.   
Beyond the Supreme Court, another major trend against private enforcement 
mechanisms in health law has been the state legislatures’ limitation or 
elimination of non-economic and punitive damages in medical malpractice 
litigation.  These damages caps at least attempt to serve the same purpose, 
dissuading courts and litigants in their attempts to regulate physician 
negligence.27 
This Part fleshes out the four stories of health law’s trend away from the 
private enforcement model. 
 
23 See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 537-39 (listing cases from 2001 and 2002 that 
limited civil rights plaintiffs’ access to courts). 
24 See, e.g., Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) (holding that punitive damages are 
unavailable under § 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 505(a)(2) of the 
Rehabilitation Act); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding 
that state governments cannot be sued for violating the Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act).  
25 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (requiring 
arbitration of employment-related claims of state discrimination). 
26 Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (requiring prisoners to exhaust 
administrative remedies before filing suit alleging excessive force by corrections officers); 
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740-41 (2001) (finding that prisoners must exhaust prison 
administrative remedies before seeking money damages in court); Alexander v. Sandoval, 
532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (finding that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not 
contain a private right of action).  
27 The empirical evidence so far indicates that damages caps have had little if any effect 
on awards recovered in medical malpractice cases and have had little impact on healthcare 
costs.  See Moncrieff, supra note 4, at 855 n.37.  That said, the spirit of the caps is the same 
as the spirit of the other limits on private enforcement; the attempt is to dissuade litigation. 
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A. Gonzaga and Medicaid 
In Gonzaga University v. Doe28 (a decision that Chief Justice Rehnquist 
called his “sleeper case” of 200229), the Supreme Court narrowed the 
availability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for enforcing federal statutes.30  Section 1983 
provides a private right of action against state actors for deprivations “of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the 
United States.31  Because the provision refers to laws as well as the 
Constitution, plaintiffs have long used § 1983 to enforce federal statutes 
against state agents. 
But in Gonzaga, the Court held that § 1983 did not provide a right of action 
for a violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),32 
finding that FERPA did not create any “personal rights”33 that could be 
vindicated through a § 1983 action.  In so holding, the Court announced a more 
restrictive test for the availability of § 1983 for correcting federal statutory 
violations, allowing private enforcement of only those federal statutes that 
intended to create and confer individual rights in the plaintiff.  In other words, 
the Court announced that plaintiffs could use § 1983 only to protect their own 
rights, not to enforce a general statutory scheme (even when such enforcement 
would provide the plaintiff a direct and tangible benefit). 
Importantly, two of the Court’s central considerations – beyond the text of 
the relevant provision – in holding that FERPA did not create and confer 
individual rights were, first, that FERPA was a Spending Clause statute and, 
second, that the statute specified a regulatory enforcement scheme, charging 
the Secretary of Education with withdrawing federal funds from noncompliant 
institutions.34  Because Congress passed the statute merely as a grants program 
for the states, because Congress intended for the statute to be enforced through 
regulatory funding decisions, and because the relevant provision did not clearly 
create and confer an enforceable right in the plaintiff, the Court reasoned, the 
legislature must not have intended to allow individual private enforcement 
through § 1983.35 
 
28 536 U.S. 273 (2002). 
29 Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation: Supreme Court 
Review, 19 TOURO L. REV. 625, 663 (2003). 
30 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 276. 
31 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
32 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006). 
33 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 276. 
34 Id. at 278-79. 
35 Of course, even after Gonzaga, Congress can pass provisions under its Spending 
Clause power that create and confer individual rights.  The text of the provision is the first 
line of inquiry, and if it seems to be rights-creating text, then the courts will still allow 
private enforcement.  See Huberfeld, supra note 1, at 446-47 (observing that several circuits 
still allow Medicaid beneficiaries to use § 1983 to enforce the “minimum services” 
provision, which vests individual rights in beneficiaries). 
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Since Gonzaga was decided, all but one of the federal courts of appeal that 
have considered the question have applied Gonzaga to preclude individual 
enforcement of several Medicaid provisions, including a central Medicaid 
requirement known as the Equal Access Provision.36  The Equal Access 
Provision is a part of the federal Medicaid Act, requiring state agencies to 
reimburse providers at a rate that is “consistent with efficiency, economy, and 
quality of care and [is] sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and 
services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and 
services are available to the general population in the geographic area.”37  In 
short, it requires state agencies to pay doctors at a rate that is competitive with 
private market payments.38  The fear that motivates the provision is that 
doctors will refuse to treat Medicaid patients if the program pays too little.39 
Before Gonzaga was decided, providers and patients could (and did) use     
§ 1983 to enforce the Equal Access Provision, suing heads of state Medicaid 
agencies for cutting reimbursement rates on the ground that the cut rate would 
be too low to meet federal statutory requirements.40  Since Gonzaga, however, 
most courts of appeal have held that the Equal Access Provision does not 
create and confer enforceable rights and have therefore held that providers and 
patients lack standing to enforce the provision.41 
Of course, that holding seems right under the Gonzaga logic.  Like FERPA, 
the Medicaid Act is a spending statute; its central creation is not a substantive 
federal program like Medicare but rather a set of grants to subsidize state-run 
 
36 See Andrew R. Gardella, Note, The Equal Access Illusion: A Growing Majority of 
Federal Courts Erroneously Foreclose Private Enforcement of § 1396a(a)(30) of the 
Medicaid Act Using 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 697, 733-42 (2008) (discussing 
cases in which the First, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the Equal 
Access Provision does not create an individual right enforceable under § 1983 while only 
the Eight Circuit has held that it does). 
37 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2006). 
38 See Moncrieff, supra note 1, at 685-87. 
39 Id. at 684-85 (explaining that the basic purpose of the Equal Access Provision was to 
avoid a “dual-tracked” medical system in which Medicaid beneficiaries would have access 
to different and worse doctors than patients with non-Medicaid insurance).  
40 See id. at 677-78 (describing pre-Gonzaga cases). 
41 See AlohaCare v. Haw. Dep’t Human Servs., 572 F.3d 740, 746 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(finding that AlohaCare did not have a private right of action under several Medicaid 
sections related to the state’s ability and limitations in contracting with providers); Equal 
Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 703 (5th Cir. 2007); Long Term Care 
Pharmacy Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 51, 57-59 (1st Cir. 2004); Devi M. Rao, Note, 
“Making Medical Assistance Available”: Enforcing the Medicaid Act’s Availability 
Provision Through § 1983 Litigation, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1440, 1461-62 n.155.  But see 
Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 655-57 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(upholding a preliminary injunction against California’s rate reduction legislation on the 
ground that it would violate the Supremacy Clause). 
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public health insurance.42  Also like FERPA, the Medicaid Act’s substantive 
requirements – including the Equal Access Provision – are “requirements” 
only insofar as states that refuse to comply will risk losing their Medicaid 
grants.  That is, the substantive requirements are merely conditions for receipt 
of federal funds.43  And finally, like FERPA, the Medicaid Act charges a 
federal administrator – the head of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services – with enforcing the Act’s substantive requirements by denying 
federal funding to any non-compliant Medicaid plan. 
Given that the Medicaid Act’s structure is so similar to FERPA’s structure, 
the conclusion is rightly the same: the Equal Access Provision did not intend to 
create or confer privately enforceable rights.44  But, of course, that holding 
strips individuals of the power to enforce certain Medicaid rules through 
litigation, even when those individuals have been harmed by the statutory 
violation.  In other words, the holding disarms private litigation in Medicaid 
regulation.45 
B. Davila and Employer-Sponsored Insurance 
In the second story, the Supreme Court did not narrow or eliminate private 
rights of action per se but rather interpreted the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)46 in a way that effectually foreclosed private 
actions against employer-sponsored managed care organizations (MCOs).  In 
 
42 See Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism: 
A Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 297, 304-05 (1996) 
(describing the interactions of state and federal funding in Medicaid and the interactions of 
state and federal law in Medicaid before Gonzaga). 
43 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (stating that Congress has 
constitutional authority to “attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds”). 
44 There are, however, several individual provisions of the Medicaid Act that have been 
found to confer individual rights.  See Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg’l Ctrs.-Glen Hazel, 570 
F.3d 520, 527 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that Medicaid’s Federal Nursing Home Reform 
Amendments created individuals rights); Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 201-02 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (holding that an eligibility provision codified as § 1396r-6 does create and confer 
enforceable rights); Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 772-73 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that 
the “right to fair hearing” provision, § 1396a(a)(3), “creates an obligation on the part of the 
State and is phrased in terms of benefitting Medicaid recipients”); see also Brian J. Dunne, 
Comment, Enforcement of the Medicaid Act Under 42 USC § 1983 After Gonzaga 
University v Doe: The “Dispassionate Lens” Examined, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 991, 996-1012 
(2007) (discussing the circuit courts’ various interpretive methodologies for determining 
whether an enforceable right exists and noting some provisions that continue to be 
enforceable after Gonzaga); Rao, supra note 41, at 1463-80 (explaining that the Medicaid 
Act’s Availability Clause has been found enforceable under Gonzaga and urging that 
Clause’s continued enforcement even after recent amendments to the Medicaid Act). 
45 See Mashaw & Calsyn, supra note 42, at 304 (describing the importance of § 1983 
litigation, before Gonzaga, for enforcing federal Medicaid requirements). 
46 Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 502(a)(1)(B), 88 
Stat. 891 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006)) 
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Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,47 the question before the Court was whether 
ERISA preempts state laws that expose employer-sponsored MCOs to 
consequential and punitive damages for injuries resulting from claim denials.  
The Court held that it did. 
In Davila, a Texas doctor had recommended that his patient, Juan Davila, 
take Vioxx for arthritis pain rather than a cheaper alternative drug, Naprosin.48  
The doctor’s recommendation was based on Davila’s history of stomach ulcers 
and the knowledge that Naprosin could, as a side-effect, aggravate Davila’s 
gastrointestinal condition.  Despite the doctor’s recommendation, Davila’s 
employer-sponsored MCO, Aetna, denied the claim for Vioxx but agreed to 
cover Naprosin, asserting that Davila should try the cheaper option first.  
Rather than paying out-of-pocket for Vioxx, Davila accepted Aetna’s direction 
and started on Naprosin.  As the doctor had feared, the Naprosin severely 
worsened Davila’s gastrointestinal problems, causing serious and lasting 
injury.  Davila sued Aetna under Texas statutory law, asserting that Aetna was 
negligent in denying the claim for Vioxx against the doctor’s recommendation 
and asserting on that basis that the MCO was liable for his injuries, a claim that 
the Texas statute explicitly allowed.   
The case reached the Supreme Court, which held that ERISA preempted the 
state statute.  Because ERISA itself provides a cause of action “to recover 
benefits due,”49 the Court held that the Texas statute fell “within the scope” of 
ERISA and thereby triggered ERISA’s preemption provision.50  With that 
holding, the Court shielded employer-sponsored MCOs from any and all state 
tort liability for coverage decisions that proximately cause injury to patients.51   
Standing alone, of course, the Davila decision does not entirely disarm 
private litigation because it allows individual suit under the ERISA civil action 
and remedial provisions.52  But in a prior decision,53 the Court had also held 
 
47 542 U.S. 200, 204 (2004). 
48 This case looks ironic in retrospect, given what we now know about Vioxx and its 
impact on heart health.  See Juhana Karha & Eric J. Topol, The Sad Story of Vioxx, and 
What We Should Learn from It, 71 CLEV. CLINIC J. MED. 933, 933 (2004) (discussing the 
implications of the Vioxx scandal on the prescription drug market); Editorial, Vioxx: An 
Unequal Partnership Between Safety and Efficacy, 364 LANCET 1287, 1288 (2004) 
(describing one study on the use of Vioxx that “revealed a significant increase in the number 
of myocardial infarctions in patients taking rofecoxib [(Vioxx)] compared with those 
receiving naproxen [(Aleve)]”); Peter Loftus & Jonathan D. Rockoff, Merck Settles Some 
Vioxx Suits, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2010, at B4 (“[Merck] removed Vioxx from the market in 
2004, after a study showed the painkiller doubled the risk of heart attack or stroke.”). 
49 ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 502(a)(1)(B), 88 Stat. 891, 891 (1974) (codified at 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006)). 
50 Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 200, 210-14. 
51 Id. at 221 n.7 (holding that ERISA preempts state law but reserving the question of 
whether one of ERISA’s remedial provisions, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), might allow for 
consequential or punitive damages). 
52 See ERISA § 502. 
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that ERISA’s remedial provision, which provides for “equitable relief”54 in the 
case of a wrongful benefits denial, allows patients to recover only the value of 
the denied benefit.  In other words, if Davila had sued under ERISA instead of 
the Texas statute, he could have recovered only the cost of Vioxx coverage.  
He could not have recovered any consequential damages for the injury to his 
gastrointestinal system, nor could he have recovered punitive damages to deter 
Aetna from denying future valid claims. 
Given ERISA’s broad preemptive force and narrow remedial scheme, 
patients are now completely unable to use litigation for regulation when their 
employer-sponsored health insurers abuse discretion in claims processing.55  
When an MCO denies a claim, the patient can use ERISA to enforce the 
contract – can get specific performance – but she cannot recover make-whole 
damages for resulting injuries nor effect punishment for the violation nor 
deterrence of future violations. 
C. Medtronic and Medical Devices 
Like the ERISA story, the medical devices story centers on federal 
preemption of state-law causes of action rather than on direct limitations of 
private enforcement.  In Riegel v. Medtronic, the Supreme Court held that 
federal statute preempts common-law products liability suits against those 
medical devices that have been approved for the market through the Food and 
Drug Administration’s (FDA) premarket approval process.56 
The question in Riegel was whether an express preemption provision in the 
Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)57 
preempted Charles Riegel’s common law complaints against Medtronic’s 
balloon catheter.  Riegel’s doctors had used the Medtronic catheter to open his 
arteries, despite the fact that the catheter was contraindicated for a patient in 
Riegel’s condition.58  The catheter exploded, causing serious injury.   
Because FDA had found the catheter to be safe and effective through its 
premarket approval process (the most extensive and rigorous of FDA’s safety 
and efficacy inquiries)59 and because the FDCA provision governing premarket 
 
53 Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209-18 (2001) 
(interpreting ERISA’s remedial provision extremely narrowly). 
54 ERISA, § 502(a)(3). 
55 Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court’s 
“encompassing interpretation of ERISA’s preemptive force” coupled with its “cramped 
construction of the ‘equitable relief’ allowable under § 502(a)(3)” creates a “‘regulatory 
vacuum’” in which no remedy exists (citations omitted)). 
56 Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312, 320-29 (2008). 
57 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). 
58 Riegel, 552 U.S. at 320. 
59 See id. at 316-20 (describing the premarket approval process for Class III medical 
devices); Jordan Paradise et al., Evaluating Oversight of Human Drugs and Medical 
Devices: A Case Study of the FDA and Implications for Nanobiotechnology, 37 J.L. MED. & 
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approvals expressly preempted state-based safety and efficacy requirements,60 
Medtronic argued that it could not be held liable under state-based common-
law theories of strict liability, breach of warranty, or negligence.61  The Court 
agreed with Medtronic, holding that common law duties constitute state-based 
safety and efficacy “requirements” and therefore fall within the scope of the 
FDCA’s preemption provision.62   
This holding has the same effect as the Davila holding; Riegel prevents 
individuals from raising an alarm and compelling disclosures in state court 
when medical devices malfunction, just as Davila prevents individuals from 
raising an alarm in state court when employer-sponsored MCOs misbehave.63  
Also like the holding in Davila, the holding in Riegel entirely prevents 
individuals from using litigation as regulation because the federal alternative – 
the FDCA (like ERISA) – does not provide for federal actions to recover 
consequential or punitive damages for malfunctioning devices.64  Indeed, the 
medical device situation after Riegel may be even starker than the ESI situation 
after Davila because the FDCA does not provide any cause of action to replace 
the preempted state torts.  It is thus entirely impossible after Riegel for 
individuals harmed by certain medical devices to enforce legal safety 
requirements against the devices’ manufacturers.65 
D. State Legislatures and Medical Malpractice 
The fourth story of disappearing private enforcement is different in kind and 
scope from the others, but it marks the same trend of limiting private 
enforcement.  It is the story of state statutory limits on damages arising from 
medical malpractice.  Since the 1970s, which marked the first medical 
malpractice “crisis” of the modern era,66 state legislatures have sought to limit 
 
ETHICS 598, 601-02 (2009) (describing FDA approval processes for medical devices in 
various classes). 
60 See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a), quoted in Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316. 
61 See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 319-21. 
62 Id. at 322-23.  
63 See Lawrence O. Gostin, The Deregulatory Effects of Preempting Tort Litigation: 
FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 299 JAMA 2313, 2315 (2008) (outlining the benefits 
of a tort system for device regulation, including tort’s ability “through the discovery process 
. . . [to] compel corporations to disclose everything they know, or reasonably should know, 
about [a medical device’s] safety and effectiveness”). 
64 See id. at 2313 (explaining that Riegel “removes all means of judicial recourse for 
most consumers injured by defective medical devices”). 
65 But see Bruce Patsner, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.: Revisiting Preemption for Medical 
Devices, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 305, 306 (Summer 2009) (describing the limits of the 
Riegel holding); Malika Kanodia, Note, The Fate of the Injured Patient in the Wake of 
Riegel v. Medtronic: Should Congress Interject?, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 791, 813-14 (2009) 
(explaining that the FDCPA does not preempt some limited tort claims as long as the 
requirements of the tort claim are sufficiently similar to federal requirements). 
66 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice 
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costs arising from medical malpractice litigation.  One of the most popular 
reform measures among state legislatures, following California’s Medical 
Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975, has been to cap or otherwise limit 
noneconomic and punitive damages that a plaintiff can recover for iatrogenic 
injuries.67  As of 2010, forty-one states limit noneconomic or punitive damages 
in some way.68 
This story is different in scope and kind from the others for two reasons.  
First and most obviously, its source is different.  The story is a political one 
rather than a judicial one and a state-based one rather than a federal one.  The 
medical malpractice caps might therefore bear greater political legitimacy than 
the Court’s limits on private enforcement, and the caps obviously are not 
uniform across the country, as the Court’s limits are.  The second reason for 
difference is slightly subtler: whereas the Court’s holdings have firmly closed 
courthouse doors to individual litigants, the medical malpractice caps have not.  
Patients can still bring medical malpractice claims in every state; the caps 
merely decrease patients’ incentive to litigate and their ability to use such 
litigation to penalize misbehaving doctors. 
Despite these differences, the caps mark the same trend as the Court’s 
decisions.  By decreasing individual litigants’ incentive to sue and ability to 
penalize, medical malpractice damages caps limit the potential of private 
enforcement to deter medical negligence.69  Furthermore, because the limits 
apply only to noneconomic and punitive damages, the caps do not primarily 
limit the tort system’s compensatory role but rather its deterrence goal.  This 
 
Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 759-61 (1977); 
Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 
1975 DUKE L.J. 1417, 1417 (1975).  But see, e.g., NEAL C. HOGAN, UNHEALED WOUNDS: 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 129-33 (Eric Rise ed., 2003) 
(recounting the emergence of the malpractice crisis and dating it back to the 1950s); Cecilia 
Loh, An Overview of Medical Malpractice and the Tort Reform Debate, CASE WESTERN 
(Apr. 23, 2003), http://www.case.edu/med/epidbio/mphp439/Malpractice.htm (dating the 
first medical malpractice “crisis” to 1840). 
67 See Ronen Avraham, Database of State Tort Law Reforms (DSTLR, 3rd) (Apr. 1, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=902711 (listing several state limitations on punitive and 
noneconomic damages); Medical Malpractice/Medical Liability, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=18516 (last updated Mar. 22, 
2010) [hereinafter NCSL]. 
68 NCSL, supra note 67.  Of the nine states that do not currently have damages caps, two 
have had such caps declared unconstitutional, and one has a constitutional provision 
specifically prohibiting such caps.  In Oregon, the monetary cap was deemed 
unconstitutional, but the State continues to prohibit punitive damages absent a showing of 
malice.  Id.  
69 As previously noted, these caps have not been terribly successful at limiting 
malpractice awards, according to most empirical studies.  Nevertheless, the motivation for 
the legislation seems to be the same as the motivation for the Supreme Court’s holdings.  
See supra note 27. 
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feature of the caps places them squarely in the relevant trend away from 
litigation as a mechanism for regulation; as the Supreme Court made clear in 
its definition of § 1983’s scope, the motivation for the trend is not to eliminate 
individuals’ ability to vindicate their own legal rights but rather to shift 
systemic regulation and enforcement out of the judicial system. 
II. ALTERNATIVES AND VACUUMS 
If that’s right – if the goal of these limits on private litigation is to shift 
systemic regulation and enforcement out of state courts (rather than simply to 
prevent litigation) – then the obvious next question is where those functions 
are supposed to shift to.  The answer needn’t be legal, in the traditional sense; 
competitive private markets and their reputational sanctions might suffice to 
prevent inefficiencies, such that the answer could be “out of state courts and 
into the market.”  But because some disciplining force is necessary to restrain 
self-interested actors, we need to ask whether the private market performs that 
function in each case and, if not – if the market will fail, whether our non-
judicial public regulators can work to correct market failures. 
In each of the stories considered here, private markets are extremely likely 
to fail, due to high information and agency costs.70  But an alternative to 
individual litigation already exists – and has existed throughout each story’s 
timeline – with the tools necessary to correct market failures.  Unfortunately, 
the alternative public regulators have not yet fully taken the disciplining role 
that the Supreme Court and state legislators have left to them, and that lag 
represents a serious problem in each of these four stories.  Part II.A identifies 
the alternative regulator in each story and demonstrates that none of these 
regulators has fulfilled the role left to it.  Part II.B describes the information 
and agency costs that cause each of these markets to fail in the resulting 
enforcement vacuums. 
A. The Alternative Regulators 
1. Medicaid and CMS 
In the Medicaid story, the alternative regulator is the federal agency charged 
with administering the Medicaid program: the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services.71  Since Medicaid’s creation in 1965, CMS (or one of its 
predecessors, the Health Care Financing Administration or the Department of 
 
70 But see Richard A. Epstein & David A. Hyman, Controlling the Cost of Medical Care: 
A Dose of Deregulation 1-2 (Feb. 17, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1158547 (arguing that private markets will provide better results 
for the healthcare industry, at least in terms of cost controls, than public regulators). 
71 CMS is a division of the Department of Health and Human Services.  See CENTERS 
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, www.cms.hhs.gov/home/medicaid.asp (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2010). 
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Health, Education, and Welfare) has had statutory authority to approve or 
reject “state plans for medical assistance,” i.e., state Medicaid plans.72   
At its inception, the federal statute specified twenty-two conditions that state 
plans had to meet in order to qualify for federal funding, codified in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a).73  Even before the 2010 Medicaid expansion that accompanied 
President Obama’s healthcare reform legislation, the § 1396a(a) list had grown 
to seventy-three requirements74; the 2010 legislation adds even more.  
Furthermore, countless new statutory sections have joined company with         
§ 1396a(a) in conditioning federal funds.75  But the basic structure of the 
program has been the same since 1965: states submit plans for medical 
assistance, and the Medicaid Administrator (now in CMS) reviews those plans 
for compliance, either approving or rejecting federal funds.76 
Given this structure, it might make sense to ask why we ever allowed 
litigation against state agents to enforce the federal statute.  If CMS is doing its 
job, then no plan will receive federal funds and go into effect under the 
Medicaid moniker if it does not, in CMS’s opinion, comply fully with the 
federal statute.  Under such a program, it seems nonsensical to allow suit 
against the head of the state agency for violating the federal law; it would 
make more sense to allow an administrative suit or complaint against CMS for 
poor judgment in measuring the states’ compliance – perhaps a claim of 
arbitrariness or capriciousness in approving state plans.77  If § 1983 had never 
been in the picture, that enforcement mechanism might well have developed. 
Perhaps because § 1983 suits were permitted and sufficed to police 
violations, however, CMS and its predecessors have never served much of a 
gatekeeping function and have never answered for that failure in administrative 
litigation.78  Instead, CMS tends to rubber-stamp state plans and to pass the 
 
72 Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1901, 79 Stat. 343, 344 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 
(2006)) (“The sums made available under this section shall be used for making payments to 
States which have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary, State plans for medical 
assistance.”). 
73 § 1902, 79 Stat. at 344-48 (listing twenty-two requirements). 
74 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(1)-(73) (West 2009) 
75 For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a passed in 1965 with three subsections, (a)-(c); even 
before the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) passed, the list went all the 
way through subsection (ee).  The Medicaid statute as a whole consisted of five sections 
when first passed: §§ 1901–1905.  Even before PPACA, the statute included forty-five 
sections, codified between 42 U.S.C. § 1396a and 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-2.  PPACA adds even 
more. 
76 See Dunne, supra note 44, at 994-95 (discussing the options available to CMS for 
enforcing federal Medicaid requirements).  
77 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
78 See Edward A. Tomlinson & Jerry L. Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards 
in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REV. 600, 
619-20 (1976) (describing the weakness of the federal agency’s incentives to enforce federal 
requirements against state agencies); Dunne, supra note 44, at 994-95 (explaining that CMS 
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buck to state agencies when providers and beneficiaries complain.79  In fact, 
CMS directs more of its Medicaid resources to policing individual providers’ 
compliance with Medicaid fraud and abuse laws than policing state agencies’ 
compliance with the federal statute.80  On the occasions that CMS does reject 
state plans or insist on amendments thereto, it almost always does so to protect 
its own funds from perceived state raids.81  In that framework, CMS is unlikely 
to enforce something like the Equal Access Provision, which would, in its 
violation, save federal money.  Furthermore, CMS has never developed a 
robust administrative remedy for individuals wanting to challenge CMS 
approval of Medicaid plans.82  Although some administrative processes exist 
for raising challenges to Medicaid plans, including challenges to 
reimbursement rates, Medicaid’s administrative process (unlike Medicare’s) 
has never been an effective means of enforcing the federal statute.83 
In the end, then, although CMS has the authority (the duty, really) to enforce 
the federal statute against state agencies, it has never created an enforcement 
scheme that would work to police state failures.  Section 1983 suits have 
historically been the only effective means of enforcing the Medicaid Act 
against disobedient state agencies and state legislatures.  Now, there seems to 
be no legal mechanism for doing so. 
2. ESI and DOL 
In the employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) story, the primary alternative 
legal regulator is the Department of Labor (DOL),84 which is charged with 
administering the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).85  
 
rarely, if ever, enforces federal requirements “in a punitive sense” and discussing reasons 
for that failure). 
79 See sources cited infra note 107. 
80 See Huberfeld, supra note 1, at 466. 
81 See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-574T, MEDICAID: 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS HAVE FACILITATED STATE FINANCING SCHEMES (2004) 
(describing CMS and Congressional efforts to curtail state financing schemes that 
inappropriately increase federal Medicaid matching payments). 
82 See Huberfeld, supra note 1, at 465. 
83 Id.  Part of the reason for this failure, as many commentators have noted, is that the 
only regulatory tool that CMS has in the Medicaid program is withdrawal or withholding of 
funds.  Dunne, supra note 44, at 994-95.  That enforcement mechanism would have perverse 
effects if CMS’s goal were to force states to provide more generous – rather than less 
generous – coverage; the withdrawal of federal funding would obviously harm the states’ 
capacity to be generous. 
84 The Department of Health and Human Services has become an important secondary 
regulator with the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which charges 
the HHS Secretary with enforcing external review requirements.  See Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1104(4), 124 Stat. 119, 151 (2010). 
85 29 U.S.C. § 1135 (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of Labor to promulgate regulations 
for interpretation and enforcement of ERISA); Dietz et al., Pensions and Retirement Funds, 
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ERISA gives DOL broad statutory authority to enforce its terms, such that the 
agency has a variety of mechanisms available for regulating ESI generally and 
for regulating employer-sponsored MCOs’ claims processing decisions in 
particular.86  First, the agency could set up an administrative complaints 
process, adjudicating individuals’ claims itself and ordering the “equitable 
relief” (however defined) that ERISA provides for benefits denials.87  Second, 
it could issue a formal interpretation of the statutory term “equitable relief,”88 
holding that ERISA allows make-whole relief not only for the denied benefits 
but also for the injuries resulting from the benefits denial.  (Such an 
interpretation would, of course, be entitled to judicial deference and would 
thereby create a private enforcement mechanism in federal court.89)  Third, 
DOL could monitor employer-sponsored MCOs’ claims decisions and seek 
penalties against abusive firms, without itself providing or ordering any 
compensation to harmed patients beyond that which is currently available in 
federal court.90  Any of these options would provide a reasonable substitute for 
state tort claims against injurious MCO benefits denials.  
DOL has, however, done none of these things.  The agency has set standards 
for claims processing by health benefits plans and has set rules for internal 
appeals and external review,91 but it has not created an enforcement 
 
60A AM. JUR. 2D Pensions § 764 (2009) (outlining DOL’s authority and obligations as 
ERISA administrator). 
86 Between 1995 and 2001, Congress regularly considered legislation to increase DOL’s 
regulatory authority, but the legislation, commonly known as the “patients’ bill of rights,” 
never made it to the President’s desk.  Frances H. Miller, Why Don’t Doctors & Lawyers 
(Strangers in the Night) Get Their Act Together?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1295, 1303 (2004).  
Some of those regulatory provisions made it into the PPACA, but even without those 
changes, the Department’s authority has been sufficiently broad to allow it to regulate 
employer-sponsored MCOs.  The Department has simply chosen not to engage in the 
project. 
87 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5) (2006) (allowing the Secretary of Labor to bring a civil action 
against the administrator of an employee benefit plan for an injunction against ERISA 
violations or for other equitable relief).  See also supra text accompanying notes 52-53 
(explaining that individuals have the same access to civil actions as the Secretary under the 
terms of the statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)). 
88 § 1132(a)(5). 
89 See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (holding that 
an agency’s interpretation of its governing statute is entitled to judicial deference as long as 
the statute’s meaning is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable). 
90 ERISA and DOL already require employer-sponsored benefits plans to submit annual 
reports with information about their financial and accounting statuses and practices.  See 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(c) (2006); DOL Administration and Enforcement of ERISA, 29 C.F.R. § 
2520.103-1(b) (2010).  DOL has authority to impose civil penalties against non-complying 
plans.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(2); DOL Administration and Enforcement of ERISA, 29 
C.F.R. § 2560.502c-2 (2010).  ERISA and DOL do not, however, require any reporting 
related to claims processing or claim denials. 
91 For pre-PPACA regulations, see 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2010); Employee Retirement 
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mechanism for punishing plan administrators that fail to comply with those 
rules.92  Nor has it ever monitored claims denials itself or sought to punish 
abusive plans.  Although DOL seems aware that claim denials can be a 
problem, it has not created a regulatory enforcement scheme to avoid that 
problem.   
Additionally, although DOL apparently believes that “equitable relief” 
ought to be interpreted to allow for make-whole damages, having filed amicus 
briefs to that effect93 (a litigating position that is not entitled to deference94), it 
has not issued a formal rule advancing that interpretation.  At the time of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Davila, therefore, private enforcement was the 
only operational mechanism available for punishing a health benefits plan that 
refused to honor coverage claims, and the Supreme Court eliminated that 
mechanism. 
3. Medical Devices and FDA 
For medical devices, the alternative regulator is, of course, the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA).  Not only is FDA responsible for ensuring a 
device’s safety and efficacy before it goes to market, but also FDA has the 
authority to monitor that device’s safety and efficacy once it is on the market.  
FDA is then statutorily obliged to withdraw approval from devices that, after 
marketing, prove unsafe or ineffective over time.95  Furthermore, FDA obliges 
 
Income Security Act of 1974; Rules and Regulations for Administration and Enforcement, 
65 Fed. Reg. 70,246 (Nov. 21, 2000) (codified at 29 C.F.R.§ 2560 (2010)).  PPACA set 
additional rules for external review and involved HHS in the enforcement of those rules.  
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001(4), 124 Stat. 
119 (2010). 
92 Indeed, DOL holds that exhaustion of internal appeals to the benefits plan constitutes 
exhaustion of administrative remedies for purposes of litigation.  29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (l) 
(2010). 
93 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8-15, Amschwand v. 
Spherion Corp., 128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008) (No. 07–841) (signed by the United States Solicitor 
General as well as the Department of Labor’s Solicitor, Associate Solicitor, and Counsel for 
Appellate and Special Litigation, urging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari); Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Elaine L. Chao, Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Labor as Amicus Curiae 
supporting Appellee Requesting Affirmance at 20-21, Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough PC v. 
Bombardier Aerospace Emp. Welfare Plan, 541 U.S. 1072 (2004) (No. 03-10195). 
94 Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (“We have never 
applied [deference rules] to agency litigating positions that are wholly unsupported by 
regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.”); see also United States. v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218, 226 (2001) (holding that agency enactments are entitled to deference only if they 
carry the “force of law”).  
95 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 319-20 (2008) (“The FDA has the power 
to withdraw premarket approval based on newly reported data or existing information and 
must withdraw approval if it determines that a device is unsafe or ineffective under the 
conditions in its labeling.” (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(e)(1), 360h(e) (2006)). 
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device manufacturers to report instances of death or injury that may have 
resulted from the device’s use and to report instances of device malfunction 
that might contribute to death or injury in the future.96 
If this regulatory structure operated effectively, the tort system – at least in 
its whistleblower and deterrent capacities – might well be unnecessary.  
Manufacturers must blow the whistle on their own devices or risk losing their 
premarket approval for failure to comply with FDA regulations, and FDA can 
(without the aid of punitive damages) prevent the continued sale of unsafe 
devices by withdrawing premarket approval.97  Granted, this scheme leaves the 
individuals harmed by unsafe devices without compensation for their injuries, 
but the point here is only that the plaintiffs’ and courts’ role as regulators is 
perhaps unnecessary given FDA’s authority to force whistle-blowing and to 
effect deterrence.  Furthermore, FDA could almost certainly establish an 
administrative hearing process and an administrative remedy to recompense 
injured patients without relying on state tort systems. 
The problem is that FDA doesn’t actually play these roles with the vigor 
required to supplant the tort system and to prevent injuries.  Although FDA is 
perhaps the best of the four alternative regulators considered here insofar as it 
acknowledges post-market regulation as one of its central duties,98 the agency 
does not yet have the resources necessary to watch its preapproved devices for 
post-market problems and to correct the problems that arise.99  Again, 
therefore, the Supreme Court’s opinion seems to leave behind an enforcement 
vacuum in which manufacturers can continue to market and sell dangerous 
devices with legal impunity. 
4. Medical Error and CMS or Professional Associations 
In the story of medical error, there are two alternative regulators that could 
enforce quality standards against licensed providers: CMS and state licensure 
 
96 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360i (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 803.50(a) (2005); 21 C.F.R. § 
814.84(b)(2) (2007)). 
97 See FDA Premarket Approval of Medical Devices Rule, 21 C.F.R. § 814.46(a)(2) 
(2010) (authorizing FDA to withdraw market approval if manufacturer has failed to meet 
“any postapproval requirement imposed by . . . regulation”). 
98 See, e.g., Richard Platt et al., The New Sentinal Network – Improving the Evidence of 
Medical-Product Safety, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 645, 645 (Aug. 13, 2009) (describing 
FDA’s new efforts, congressionally authorized in 2007, to use electronic medical records to 
monitor medical product safety). 
99 See Gostin, supra note 63, at 2314 (describing FDA’s severe “resource deficits” and 
observing that those deficits “have resulted in high-profile regulatory failures”); The 
Medical Device Safety Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 1346 Before the Subcomm. on Health 
of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 14 (2009) (statement of Richard 
M. Cooper), http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090512/testimony_cooper.pdf 
(admitting, in the context of testimony supporting the Court’s decision, that “better systems 
and methods are needed generally to monitor the safety of medical products after they have 
been approved”). 
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boards.  To some extent, CMS has already started playing this role, and 
PPACA will strengthen CMS’s hand in quality control in the coming years.  
Even prior to PPACA’s passage, CMS had created a “never events” policy, by 
which it refuses to reimburse providers that make certain listed errors;100 and it 
had instituted a variety of “pay for performance” initiatives, by which it 
calibrates hospitals’ and providers’ reimbursement formulae based on evidence 
of the providers’ success rates and general quality.101  PPACA requires both 
the Medicare and Medicaid programs to expand these and similar policies and 
to study their usefulness in quality control.102   
State licensure boards also play a quality-controlling role to a certain extent, 
revoking licenses from providers that commit egregious violations (such as 
practicing the wrong kind of medicine).103 
 
100 See NAT’L QUALITY FORUM, SERIOUS REPORTABLE EVENTS IN HEALTHCARE 2006 
UPDATE: A CONSENSUS REPORT 8-16 (2007) (examples of “never events” include surgery 
performed on the wrong body part, surgery performed on the wrong patient, and wrong 
surgical procedure performed on patient.). 
101 See Details for: Medicare “Pay for Performance (P4P)” Initiatives, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SRVS. (Jan. 31, 2005), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/pres 
s/release.asp?counter=1343 (describing CMS’s initiatives that link hospital and physician 
reimbursement rates to quality measures). 
102 PPACA prohibits Medicaid plans from paying for services associated with hospital-
acquired conditions (HACs), i.e., complications or co-morbidities contracted by patients 
during a hospital stay.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, § 2702, 124 Stat. 119, 318-19 (2010). The Secretary is required to identify HACs and 
implement appropriate regulations by July 1, 2011.  Id.  Similarly, PPACA also adjusts 
Medicare payments for hospitals to incentivize reductions in HACs.  Beginning January 1, 
2015, hospitals in the top quartile of all hospitals, relative to the national average of HACs, 
will receive ninety-nine percent of applicable Medicare payment at discharge.  Id. at § 3008.  
Prior to 2015, HHS must provide confidential reports to such hospitals, and inform the 
public regarding HACs at such hospitals.  Id.  This public information must be posted to the 
Hospital Compare website.  Id.  Further, PPACA requires the DHHS to conduct a study on 
expanding the HAC payment reduction policy to other facilities that receive Medicare 
payments.  Id.  DHHS must submit this study and associated recommendations to the 
Congress by January 1, 2012.  Id. 
103 See, e.g., MED. BOARD CAL. (last visited Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.medbd.ca.gov/ 
(“The mission of the Medical Board is to protect health care consumers through the proper 
licensing and regulation of physicians and surgeons and certain allied health care 
professions and through the vigorous, objective enforcement of the Medical Practice Act, 
and, to promote access to quality medical care through the Board’s licensing and regulatory 
functions.”); MINN. BOARD MED. PRAC., http://www.state.mn.us/portal/mn/jsp/home.do?age 
ncy=BMP (last visited Sept. 16, 2010) (“The mission of the Minnesota Board of Medical 
Practice is to protect the public’s health and safety by assuring that the people who practice 
medicine or as an allied health professional are competent, ethical practitioners with the 
necessary knowledge and skills appropriate to their title and role.”); State Board of Medical 
Examiners, N.J. DIV. OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, http://www.state.nj.us/lps/ca/bme/index.html 
(last visited Sept. 16, 2010) (“New Jersey’s Medical Board is responsible for protecting the 
public’s health and safety by determining qualifications of applicants for licensure, 
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Neither CMS nor licensure boards, however, engage in the kind of intensive 
quality regulation that the tort system has intended to provide.  Uniquely 
among these four stories, the central problem here is that the regulators do not 
hear or register individual patients’ claims, which for medical malpractice is 
necessary not only for individual justice but also for systemic regulation.  
Many individual instances of negligence and of resulting iatrogenic injury do 
not fall on the categorical list of “never events,” do not constitute evidence of 
poor quality under the “pay for performance” program, and are not egregious 
enough to provoke license revocation.  As a result, even if these programs 
worked well as intended (which they might not104), they would not catch or 
punish all instances of negligence.  The reason for those programmatic gaps is 
that many instances of patient injury are extremely hard to judge; for a large 
percentage of bad outcomes in healthcare, the causal link between the patient’s 
injury and the physician’s care (or lack thereof) is hard to prove and is 
dangerous to impute.105  Did the patient get sick after surgery because the 
surgeon did something wrong, or just because she got sick, like people do?  
We can’t answer that question without looking into the circumstances of the 
individual patient. 
The strategies, thus, that CMS and licensure boards have developed so far 
for deterring negligence – refusing reimbursement, altering reimbursement 
formulae, and revoking licenses – would dramatically over-deter negligence if 
triggered by every bad outcome.  Unfortunately, though, these strategies under-
deter negligence in their current form, triggered as they are by limited 
categories of bad outcomes (those that could result from nothing but 
negligence, such as amputation of the wrong leg) without punishing any 
instances of negligence that fall outside of those categories.   
B. Market Failures and Enforcement Vacuums 
Of course, the lack of a legal mechanism for enforcement of laws and 
contracts does not automatically prove the lack of any mechanism for such 
enforcement; markets, including political ones, sometimes suffice to prevent 
violations and inefficiencies.  In each of the stories presented here, however, 
political and private markets systematically fail to achieve optimal deterrence 
and regulation.  The problem is that healthcare markets are fraught with 
information and agency costs that prevent individual voters and consumers 
from representing their own interests.  Each of these stories thus presents a 
vacuum in which actors can violate rules with impunity even despite the 
 
establishing standards for practice, and disciplining licensees who do not adhere to those 
requirements.”). 
104 See, e.g., Sandra J. Tanenbaum, Pay for Performance in Medicare: Evidentiary Irony 
and the Politics of Value, 34 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 717, 717 (2009) (evaluating the pay 
for performance initiative and concluding that it does not function as intended but is instead 
a useful political tool). 
105 Studdert & Mello, supra note 20, at S47-49. 
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presence of potential private regulators.  In each story, therefore, a public legal 
regulator ought to start working to fill the void. 
1. Medicaid 
Medicaid, of course, is not subject to many private market pressures.  
Although the rise of Medicaid managed care has allowed some private 
companies to serve as Medicaid intermediaries and although individual 
providers have the option of refusing to serve Medicaid patients (which might 
force the program to respond to providers’ interests), the process for setting 
reimbursement rates is a decidedly public, political process.  We must 
therefore look to political markets rather than private markets to restrain 
inefficiency.   
Unfortunately, however, the political market for Medicaid regulation fails in 
two significant ways, both of which arise from its “cooperative federalist” 
structure.106  First, because both state and federal lawmakers affect Medicaid 
decisions and because the federal requirements that supposedly bind state 
decision-makers are so complex, the two levels of government can (and do) 
engage in a constant cycle of buck-passing that destroys ordinary mechanisms 
of political accountability (a severe information cost).107  Second, because 
states have flexibility in setting reimbursement rates, they can engage in some 
Tiebout competition108 for the best policy bundles, but in welfare programs 
 
106 Cooperative federalism is the “[d]istribution of power between the federal 
government and the states in which each recognizes the power of the other while jointly 
engaging in certain governmental functions.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 664 (8th ed. 
2004). 
107 See Joseph Fastiggi, New York Medicaid: Never Can Say Goodbye, 16 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 581, 609-10 (2007) (lamenting the lack of information made available to 
Medicaid recipients regarding “their health and the courses of recommended treatment” and 
discussing government administrators’ propensity to shirk responsibility for Medicaid 
beneficiaries’ well being); Joshua Tenzer, Reaching the Final Frontiers in Medicaid 
Managed Care, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329, 354-57 (2006) (explaining that states 
shirk fiscal responsibility with Medicaid funds while the federal government “push[es] more 
responsibility on the states”); Sara Kay Wheeler & Tizgel K.S. High, Medicaid Enforcement 
Amidst the Perfect Storm, 9 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 25, 25-26 (2007) (explaining how 
the joint regulatory nature of Medicaid forms the “perfect storm,” creating a regulatory 
vacuum which neither CMS nor states feel compelled to fix). 
108 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 
418 (1956); see also John D. Donahue, Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and 
America’s Devolution Debate, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 75-77 (1997); Robert P. Inman & 
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 45-52 (1997);  
Moncrieff, supra note 4, at 869 (outlining the basic Tiebout theory); Larry Ribstein & Bruce 
Kobayashi, The Economics of Federalism 3-4 (Jan. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=875626. 
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like Medicaid, that competition often results not in optimality but rather in a 
“race to the bottom” (an agency cost of a sort).109  
Information Costs.  The most obvious political check on states’ violations of 
federal law is voting.  Medicaid decision-makers at the state level are all 
politically accountable; they are either state legislators who are directly subject 
to electoral incentives or state administrators who answer to an elected 
governor.110  If those decision-makers change their Medicaid programs in a 
way that violates federal law – and does so to the chagrin of state residents – 
those residents can theoretically punish their officials in the next election 
cycle.111 
But in Medicaid, it is often hard for voters to know whom they should 
punish, and gathering accurate information on that score is costly.  Because 
state Medicaid plans are subject to an extremely large and complicated web of 
federal requirements, state decision-makers can blame their unpopular moves 
on federal rules (disingenuously, of course, in the relevant case of a move that 
violates federal statute).  In a mere political marketplace, the lie probably 
would not get caught.  Information about the web of regulations is too costly to 
collect and verify, and individual voters, with their limited influence, act 
rationally in remaining ignorant of those regulations.   
A more frequent strategy for state decision-makers is to blame the paucity of 
their programs on the paucity of federal funding.  Because states are budget 
constrained, federal funding often determines the generosity of state Medicaid 
plans.112  The most common tale from state Medicaid agencies accused of 
federal statutory violations, thus, is that they lack the financial resources to do 
any better.  According to the states, the federal statute requires generous 
reimbursements and benefits (perhaps to the point of aspirationalism), but the 
federal government refuses to put its money where its mouth is.113  The states’ 
 
109 See Scott L. Greer & Peter D. Jacobson, Health Care Reform and Federalism, 35 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 203, 219-21 (2010) (explaining that fiscal competition among 
states limits the ability of the states to raise revenue for redistributive health care programs). 
110 Susan Dorr Goold et al., Choosing Healthplans All Together: A Deliberative Exercise 
for Allocating Limited Health Care Resources, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 563, 594 
(2005) (explaining that decisions regarding Medicaid are subject to “the usual methods of 
political accountability”). 
111 This point presupposes, of course, that the Medicaid violations are politically 
unpopular.  If such cuts are politically popular, then we need to ask whether the statutory 
violation is a problem at all and whether the state should continue to participate in the 
Medicaid program at all. 
112 Lisa Colosi, Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association: Making the Medicaid 
Reimbursement Rate Challenge a Federal Case, 12 PACE L. REV. 139, 142 (1992) (“To 
cover the costs of providing medical services to the poor, states primarily rely on federal 
contributions . . . .”). 
113 In many of the Equal Access Provisions cases that reached the federal appellate level, 
the states’ justification for cutting reimbursement rates was purely budgetary.  For a list of 
such cases, see Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1499 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997); Ark. 
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political answer, then, is that Congress and the President, rather than the state 
legislature and the Governor, should be punished for Medicaid problems. 
The federal government, in its turn, points out that the states demand and 
receive a great deal of flexibility in designing their Medicaid programs, 
including access to waivers that would allow eligibility or benefit cuts rather 
than reimbursement reductions.114  If a particular strategy for reducing the 
budget is unpopular, the federal government says, the state should try other 
options available for realizing savings.  (What the federal government misses, 
perhaps strategically, is that any alternative budget-cutting strategy is likely to 
be just as unpopular.)  Voters again have a hard time judging or verifying the 
reality of the situation because information about these programs is costly to 
gather, and voters are rationally ignorant of details.115 
 
Med. Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 531 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting ‘exclusively 
budgetary’ justification for rate cuts to Medicaid providers); AMISUB v. Colo. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 879 F.2d 789, 801 (10th Cir. 1989) (rejecting state Medicaid plan that resulted 
in forty-six percent reduction in provider reimbursement as being based solely on budgetary 
constraints: “While budgetary constraints may be a factor to be considered by a state when 
amending a current plan . . . budgetary constraints alone can never be sufficient”).  See 
generally Moncrieff, supra note 1 (explaining the budgetary strain that Medicaid creates for 
states and discussing the cases in which states reduced reimbursement rates in an attempt to 
avoid budget overruns). 
114 See Frank J. Thompson & Courtney Burke, Executive Federalism and Medicaid 
Demonstration Waivers: Implications for Policy and Democratic Process, 32 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 971, 993-95 (2007) (discussing the impact of the Medicaid waiver process 
on democratic transparency and legitimacy).  Some of this flexibility may diminish with the 
Medicaid expansions in PPACA, though, of course, we do not yet know how CMS will 
administer the new requirements.  PPACA expands Medicaid eligibility to include all 
individuals with income at or below 133% of the federal poverty line, who are otherwise 
ineligible for Medicaid or Medicare coverage, and also allows for federal matching of state 
expenditures associated with expanded enrollment criteria. Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001(a)(1)(C), 124 Stat. 119, 271 (2010).  The 
statute requires states to provide this population with “benchmark” or “benchmark 
equivalent” benefits by January 1, 2014.  Id. at §§ 2001(a)(1)(C), 2001(a)(2)(A).  A 
benchmark plan is equivalent to federal employees health benefit plan coverage, state 
employee coverage, coverage offered by the HMO plan that has the largest insured 
commercial, non-Medicaid enrollment in the state, or other DHHS secretary approved 
coverage.  42 C.F.R. § 440.330 (2010).  PPACA also establishes Federal Medical 
Assistance Percentage (FMAP) rate for this category of Medicaid coverage to offset related 
state expenditures.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(a)(3)(B).  From 2014 
to 2016, FMAP is 100%, i.e., the federal government will match 100% of states’ funds used 
for providing Medicaid coverage to this new category of enrollees.  Id.  The FMAP is scaled 
downward from 2017 onwards, and will be 90% from January 1, 2020. 42 U.S.C.A. § 
1396d(y)(1) (West 2010).  Additionally, PPACA requires states to provide Medicaid 
coverage to former foster children under twenty-six years of age by 2014.  Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act § 10201.  Previously, this requirement was optional for 
states.  42 U.S.C. 1396(a)(10) (2006). 
115 Beneficiaries who are harmed by federal violations, of course, act rationally when 
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Additionally, even if we assumed that all voters knew whom to blame for 
Medicaid policy choices, for the political marketplace to work, a large 
percentage of the electorate – beyond just beneficiaries and physicians – would 
need to understand and care about Medicaid decision-making enough to vote 
against legislators and governors that favored an ungenerous program.  Even 
assuming that Medicaid was a voting issue for most of the electorate, an 
average voter would have a hard time evaluating the wisdom of a given 
Medicaid policy choice.  Cutting reimbursements might be unquestionably bad 
for physicians – and might even be unidirectionally bad for already-covered 
beneficiaries – but it might be a good choice if it allows more people to be 
covered.  Such complicated policy tradeoffs are hard for voters to evaluate 
without a lot of information about the policy landscape. 
In the end, then, voters have a difficult time apportioning blame between 
state and federal governments and have a hard time evaluating Medicaid policy 
choices even when they know whom to blame for them.  Political 
accountability therefore fails as a mechanism for cabining Medicaid abuses. 
Agency Costs.  The theory of Tiebout competition is that political 
subdivisions, such as states, will compete for resident taxpayers by providing 
appealing bundles of public goods, public services, and taxes.  In other words, 
states will set themselves up as good agents of the public interest in order to 
attract principals and their concomitant revenue.116  Potential taxpayers will 
then sort themselves among those subdivisions according to their preferences 
regarding those bundles.  Theoretically, this process should result in taxing and 
spending policies that optimally reflect the preferences of the states’ residents 
(an optimal principal-agent relationship).117   
The Tiebout theory fails, however, when the good or service at issue is one 
that will attract unappealing residents, such as those that take out of the tax 
system more than they put in.118  If the public good or service is one that the 
country as a whole would benefit from providing but is one that each state 
would benefit from sloughing off onto its neighbors, then the states will 
compete to avoid the good or service and its consumers.  They will race to the 
bottom. 
 
they collect information about statutory violations, so long as the harm of the violation is 
sufficiently costly to outweigh the cost of the information.  This point is one reason that 
litigation – or administrative adjudication – is a useful tool; it allows individuals who have 
an incentive to monitor lawfulness to blow a whistle, rather than relying on general voting 
populations. 
116 Tiebout, supra note 108, at 418; Moncrieff, supra note 4, at 869. 
117 Tiebout, supra note 108, at 418. 
118 See Jan K. Brueckner, Welfare Reform and the Race to the Bottom: Theory and 
Evidence, 66 S. ECON. J. 505 (2000); Craig Volden, The Politics of Competitive Federalism: 
A Race-to-the-Bottom in Welfare Benefits?, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 352 (2002) (explaining that 
some have argued interjurisdictional competition may lead to an undersupply of welfare 
services as jurisdictions cut services to repel undesirable welfare recipients). 
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With respect to Medicaid, just such a failure occurs.119  The people that 
benefit from Medicaid and that would choose a state with generous Medicaid 
spending are, by programmatic definition, poor and sick.  They are 
overwhelmingly living at or below the Federal Poverty Line; they are taking 
Supplemental Security Income; and they are not paying state taxes.120  
Medicaid recipients are therefore net losses for state tax systems.  While it is 
good for the economy of the country as a whole if such people have pre-paid 
access to the medical market, no single state wants to attract those people to its 
jurisdiction.  Tiebout’s interjurisdictional market, therefore, imposes on the 
states the opposite incentive of the one that the federal government intended 
with the Medicaid Act, and it imposes the opposite incentive of the one that 
taxpayer-principals ought collectively (i.e., nation-wide) to prefer.  Each state’s 
incentive is to make its program as small as possible, at least relative to its 
neighbors’ programs, so that Medicaid eligible residents will move out. 
It is possible that providers, as resident taxpayers, might counteract that 
effect by choosing to leave states with low Medicaid reimbursements in favor 
of states with higher Medicaid reimbursements, causing a dearth of practicing 
physicians in states with low Medicaid reimbursement rates.  But that effect 
seems unlikely to correct the problem given that most providers (unlike 
Medicaid beneficiaries) do not depend on the Medicaid program and are thus 
less likely to uproot themselves to find a better Medicaid system.  Providers 
generally can make enough money from privately-insured and Medicare 
patients to run a good business, allowing them simply to opt out of Medicaid if 
reimbursement rates fall too low. 
Interstate competition, thus, probably does not provide enough of a check on 
state violations of the Medicaid statute.  In fact, it may be counter-productive, 
incentivizing states to make their Medicaid programs as unappealing to 
beneficiaries as possible, regardless of what federal law requires. 
2. Employer Sponsored Insurance 
In the case of employer-sponsored insurance (ESI), a robust private market 
exists that could, if operating efficiently, cabin abuses on the part of managed 
care organizations (MCOs), including abuses in claims processing.121  That 
private market has two critical parts: insurance companies competing for 
employers and employers competing for labor.122  Unfortunately, both 
 
119 See Greer & Jacobson, supra note 109, at 219; Paul E. Peterson, Devolution’s Price, 
14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 111, 118 (1996). 
120 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10) (2006) (listing eligibility groups).  
121 See David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States – 
Origins and Implications, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 82 (2006) (“More than 159 million 
Americans –  62.4 percent of the nonelderly population – had health care coverage through 
employer-sponsored insurance in 2004.”). 
122 See James Maxwell & Peter Temin, Corporate Management of Quality in Employee 
Health Plans, 28 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. 27, 27 (2000) [hereinafter Corporate 
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components of that market suffer from high transaction costs that weaken the 
market’s regulatory capacity.123  The first – the insurance market – is fraught 
with information costs, preventing individual patients and even large 
employers from judging the quality of a given insurance contract.  Employers 
could bear those information costs with sufficient investment, but they will be 
willing to optimize that investment only if they are good agents for their 
employees, which (despite the robust labor market) they often are not.124 
Information Costs.  The market for employer-sponsored health insurance is 
undoubtedly a competitive one, with many MCOs and other insurers trying to 
sell their products to many employers.125  In the relevant case – in the only 
case that is governed by the ERISA shield – the employer does not hire the 
MCO to bear the financial risk of its employees’ healthcare losses.  ERISA 
protects from liability only those employer-sponsored plans that are “self-
insured,” in which the employer is financially responsible for its employees’ 
healthcare claims.  The employer-sponsored MCO, then, is responsible only 
for administering benefits, deciding whether a claim is payable or not; it does 
not bear any financial risk. 
In that market for MCO administration, employers ought to be trying to 
maximize value.  That is, if employers are good agents for their employees, 
they will try to spend as little as possible but as much as necessary to get a 
healthcare administrator that operates honestly and well, optimizing the cost-
benefit trade.126  Part of that value in the case of an MCO (which is charged 
 
Management] (finding that employers have been “conducting intensive price negotiations 
with health plans”); see also JAMES MAXWELL ET AL., CORPORATE HEALTH CARE 
PURCHASING AMONG THE FORTUNE 500, at 8 (2001) [hereinafter FORTUNE 500] (“Large 
companies have a competitive need to attract and retain skilled employees, especially in 
today’s tight labor markets.”). 
123 See Robert S. Galvin & Suzanne Delbanco, Why Employers Need to Rethink How 
They Buy Healthcare, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1549, 1550 (2005) (“Quantitative data are critical to 
procurement, yet fewer than half of firms perform financial analysis on their health care 
costs, and fewer than a third use hard-dollar ‘return-on-investment’ calculations in their 
decisionmaking.”). 
124 See, e.g., Corporate Management, supra note 122, at 28 (finding that Fortune 500 
employers use a broader definition of health care quality that focuses more on service 
quality and less on clinical quality). 
125 See James Maxwell et al., Corporate Health Care Purchasing and the Revised Social 
Contract with Workers, 39 BUS. & SOC’Y 281, 287 (2000) [hereinafter Revised Social 
Contract] (“Consumers (employees) keep down the cost of health care by forcing health 
plans to compete among themselves, just as the producers of other goods and services do.”). 
126 See Galvin & Delbanco, supra note 123, at 1549 (arguing that employers’ economic 
interest and expertise in supply-management chain “should result in employers’ using their 
procurement expertise to increase the value of their health care expenditures”); Pamela B. 
Peele et al., Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance: Are Employers Good Agents for Their 
Employees?, 78 MILBANK Q. 5, 7 (2000) (hypothesizing that if employers are good agents, 
they will “understand[] their employees’ health plan preferences” and “establish 
mechanisms for . . . providing useful information to their employees about their health 
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with determining eligibility for benefits on a case-by-case basis under “medical 
necessity” review) would undoubtedly be the MCO’s claims processing habits.  
An MCO that habitually denies valid claims – maliciously or negligently 
deeming them medically unnecessary127 – ought to fail in the competitive ESI 
market.128 
But in order to determine whether an MCO is abusive or arbitrary in claims 
processing, one needs to aggregate information across patients and over time; 
individual complaints or stories are insufficient to draw conclusions.129  
Because we want MCOs to deny claims for medical services that are 
unnecessary and because both doctors and patients have incentives to over-
consume medical care,130 we cannot deem every denial of benefits about which 
a patient or doctor complains to be negligent or abusive.  Furthermore, because 
causation is difficult to prove, we cannot impute MCO malice or negligence 
from a patient’s bad outcome.  Only by examining trends in claims processing 
can an MCO consumer determine whether the insurer has a bad or abusive 
habit of denying claims.  Part of the value of the ESI system, then, is that 
employers (and other large-group purchasers) are well-positioned to aggregate 
information across employees and over time.131  Unlike individual consumers, 
large-group purchasers have the capacity to become well-informed consumers 
in the MCO market.132   
 
insurance offerings”); WATSON WYATT WORLDWIDE, 12TH ANNUAL NATIONAL BUSINESS 
GROUP ON HEALTH/WATSON WYATT SURVEY REPORT 2 (2007), available at http://www.corp 
syn.net/Special/images/SPC_090607_WatsonWyatt.pdf (declaring that “best-performing 
companies” have significantly lower annual expenditure increases for their health care 
programs). 
127 One reason that the ERISA shield applies only to self-insured employer plans – i.e., 
plans under which employers directly bear the risk of their employees’ healthcare losses – is 
that the MCO that processes claims in the relevant case does not have a financial incentive 
to deny claims.  Because the MCO’s finding that a claim is “medically necessary” and 
therefore valid will cause the employer rather than the MCO to lose money, the likelihood 
of malicious denial is relatively low in the relevant case, as compared to the non-relevant 
case of a fully insured employer. 
128 See Stephen Blakely, The Backlash Against Managed Care, NATION’S BUS. At 16 
(July 1998), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1154/is_n7_v86/ai_ 
20797610/?tag=content;col1 (describing patients’ growing discontent with managed care). 
129 See Peele et al., supra note 126, at 15-16 (finding that employees were hesitant about 
making plan choices on their own and felt that employers “were much better equipped to 
sort through the plans and options than they were individually”). 
130 For a thorough review of health care consumer and provider incentives, see generally 
CHARLES E. PHELPS, HEALTH ECONOMICS (Addison Wesley 3d ed. 2002). 
131 Peele et al., supra note 126, at 15-16. 
132 See Corporate Management, supra note 122, at 38 (stating that Fortune 500 
companies “routinely collect large amounts of data and use them in their purchasing 
decisions”).  This distinction is, incidentally, part of why the individual market for MCOs 
fails so completely, and it is a good reason for maintaining private actions against MCOs 
that are not employer-sponsored. 
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But such information aggregation is expensive.  Employers would need to 
establish reporting mechanisms so that they would know when claims were 
denied, and they would need to analyze trends in claims denials.  Employers 
would also need to investigate causation – a tricky question in any medical 
case – when a denial correlated to an injury, in order to determine whether the 
MCO should have known ex ante that denying the claim would likely cause 
harm.   
The good news is that employers do play this role to some extent.133  
Particularly large corporate purchasers are aware of quality differentials among 
MCOs, and many large employers do have reporting systems in place that 
allow their employees to file complaints when their claims are denied.  The 
bad news is that employers probably do not monitor MCOs sufficiently to 
eliminate abuses or even to optimize regulation, even though it would certainly 
be in their employees’ interests for them to avoid bad MCOs.134 
Agency Costs.  The natural next question is whether we have any reason to 
believe that employers are investing less in this information than their 
employees would choose to invest if they were deciding for themselves.  In 
other words, is there agency slack between employers and employees that 
results in sub-optimal investment, relative to employees’ preferences?  And the 
answer is probably yes.   
The cost of employees’ health insurance premiums comes out of employees’ 
wages, not shareholders’ profits.135 As a result, when it comes to spending on 
insurance premiums, employers should be willing to spend any amount that 
their employees are willing to spend.  That is, employers have no incentive to 
under-invest in premiums relative to their employees’ preferences.  But the 
administrative cost of monitoring a health insurance company and the 
administrative cost of punishing insurers for abuses might be a different story; 
those costs might be much harder to pass on to employees in the form of 
decreased wages.  Although there is evidence that employees will choose an 
 
133 See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 121, at 86 (“Pressed by rising costs, private 
employers have pushed insurance companies to develop new approaches to organizing and 
financing care that they hope will limit expenses without alienating their employees.”); 
Galvin & Deblanco, supra note 123, at 1550 (“[A] minority [of employers] factor quality 
information into health plan selection and contracting.”); James Maxwell et al., Corporate 
Health Care Purchasing Among Fortune 500 Firms, 20 HEALTH AFF. 181, 186 (2001) 
[hereinafter Corporate Health Care Purchasing] (“The study documents relatively 
widespread awareness of quality measurement among the Fortune 500, with companies 
reporting the routine collection of large amounts of quality related data.”). 
134 See, e.g., Galvin & Delbanco, supra note 123, at 1550 (arguing that employers do not 
focus enough resources or the right resources for employees’ ESI plans). 
135 See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 121, at 85 (“This dynamic leads economists to argue 
that ultimately employers pass the costs of health care on to workers who pay for their own 
health insurance in the form of wages or others benefits foregone.”); Peele et al., supra note 
126, at 5 (“Economists argue that employees effectively pay for most of their nonwage 
benefits through lower wages.”). 
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employer based on general generosity of the benefits package,136 it is much 
less likely that employees will choose an employer based on a specific MCO’s 
quality or based on the employer’s efforts to ensure MCO quality.  Those 
things are simply harder for prospective employees to see and measure than the 
general scope of the benefits package and the premiums paid for insurance, 
particularly given that prospective employees lack the aggregate information 
needed to judge MCO quality.   
Even in a competitive labor market, therefore, the employer might not have 
much of an incentive to invest in information about MCO quality in order to 
compete for good labor, and the employer might not be able to charge its 
employees for the service of aggregating information if it chooses to do so on 
the employees’ behalf.  The employer’s incentive might, therefore, be to do 
what’s cheapest, not what’s best.137 
The bottom line here is that employers have the capacity to “regulate” MCO 
abuses through market competition, and they do play that role to some extent.  
But employers’ abilities are limited by the information costs of monitoring 
MCO behavior and by the failures in the agency relationship between 
employers and their employees. 
3. Medical Devices 
As with ESI, there are several competitive markets operating in the medical 
device story that might cabin manufacturers’ ability to sell unsafe products.  
First, manufacturers must sell their products to doctors and hospitals, both of 
which have incentives to provide good care in order to attract insurance 
contracts and patients.  Second, manufacturers must convince public and 
private insurance companies to cover their new technologies, and those 
insurers have incentives to avoid costly injuries to their patients.  Those 
markets, however, fail in ways essentially identical to the ESI markets, with 
the providers, hospitals, and insurance companies serving as the agents 
positioned to aggregate information about device quality.   
Information Costs.  As with MCOs, devices are hard to judge based on 
individual stories.  In any given case, a patient’s bad outcome might not have 
been the device’s fault at all.  And even when the device clearly malfunctions, 
its failure might have been the doctor’s fault or simply a single bad device 
whose malfunction will not be replicated.  In order to draw the conclusion that 
a device is generally unsafe or ineffective, one needs to see a trend of harmful 
malfunctions or a trend of unsatisfactory patient outcomes.  Individual patients, 
of course, cannot easily see those trends when deciding whether to use a 
particular device.  In fact, at the point of purchase, individual consumers are 
not likely to have any basis for judging the device’s safety; consumers have not 
 
136 FORTUNE 500, supra note 122, at 9 (“Health benefits were viewed as contributing 
most to employee attraction . . . .”). 
137 Corporate Health Care Purchasing, supra note 133, at 186 (suggesting that 
employers care more about driving down cost than quality of care). 
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yet had any experience with the device themselves, and few will have had 
exposure to other patients who have used the device. 
Fortunately, doctors, hospitals, and insurance companies are (at least 
somewhat) well-positioned to see such trends.  Not only does each individual 
doctor gain experience with a given device as she uses it across patients, but 
also each hospital and insurer can see the device’s utility and success across 
doctors.  If a device is unsafe or ineffective, doctors and hospitals can simply 
stop buying it and stop using it on their patients, regardless of whether the 
device retains FDA approval or not, and insurance companies can refuse to 
reimburse for such devices. 
As in the ESI case, though, this process of aggregating information and 
learning from emerging trends is not free.  Doctors, hospitals, and insurance 
companies would need to establish mechanisms for monitoring device 
malfunctions and bad outcomes, and they would need to analyze the individual 
cases of malfunction to ensure that those cases were actually attributable to the 
device rather than to the doctor or patient.  Although the benefits of that 
information for patients might be quite high, there is no doubt that the 
information is extremely costly. 
Agency Costs.  The question, then (as in the employer case), is whether the 
actors that are positioned to aggregate information have the right balance of 
incentives to optimize their investment.  Will they invest the same amount that 
their patients collectively would choose to invest in gathering information 
about device quality?  And the answer, once again, is probably not.  Most of 
the costs of malfunctioning devices are borne by patients, not doctors, 
hospitals, or insurers,138 so that the agents in this case do not internalize the full 
cost to their principals. 
Perhaps counter-intuitively, doctors and hospitals might be worse agents for 
their patients in this case than insurers.  Although the Hippocratic Oath and the 
markets for doctors and hospitals prevent egregious abuses, all providers have 
incentives to provide as much care as they can, especially if they are 
reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis (as most doctors still are).139  Even if not 
on fee-for-service, providers have incentives to provide the care that brings 
them the highest possible profits.  Doctors and hospitals, thus, might want to 
continue using risky devices for as long as possible in order to bill for the extra 
intervention, and they might therefore want to avoid information about the 
devices’ malfunctions.   
 
138 See James T. O’Reilly, Pin the Tail on the Other Donkey: Allocating and Avoiding 
Injury Losses After Drug or Device Approval, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 559, 571 (2007) (“No 
one looks forward to being an injured plaintiff, no one aspires to be the subject of Form 
FDA-3500 adverse experience reports, so the loss from medical and product error stays with 
the least effective lobbying force, the patients.”). 
139 INST. OF MED., REWARDING PROVIDER PERFORMANCE: ALIGNING INCENTIVES IN 
MEDICARE 4 (2006) (suggesting that fee-for-service pay structures encourages over use and 
thus higher costs and substandard care). 
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To take the point to a macabre extreme that one hopes and expects to be 
rare: doctors and hospitals in the current system actually get paid more for 
injuring their patients than for curing them.  If doctors or hospitals use a device 
that malfunctions, they get paid for the initial intervention as well as for any 
interventions that become necessary to fix resulting injuries (excepting 
reimbursement for the consequences of “never events” from payers with such 
policies140).  Even after discovering new evidence of a device’s risks, 
therefore, an unscrupulous doctor might continue to use it. 
Insurers’ incentives, by contrast, at least follow the same vector as their 
patients’ incentives because the insurers often get stuck with higher costs when 
their patients get injured.  Unlike doctors, insurers lose money as the number 
of interventions increases; they pay for initial and post-injury interventions on 
behalf of the patients they cover.  As a result, insurers might want to set 
incentives for doctors and patients to avoid using risky devices, such as by 
refusing to cover certain technologies or by setting strict guidelines for 
coverable uses of such technologies, in order to avoid paying consequential 
claims when devices malfunction.  Insurers, thus, might well have the right 
incentives to monitor device malfunction and to tinker with the private market 
for device purchase and use, effectively punishing sloppy manufacturers by 
shrinking their market. 
Unfortunately, though, most insurers (indeed, all insurers but Medicare) do 
not keep their patients long enough to suffer the full cost of disabling injuries.  
If a device malfunctions in a way that causes a lifelong disability, the insurance 
company will bear the cost of treatment only until the patient qualifies for 
public insurance, at sixty-five or at a point of coverable disability (whichever 
comes first).141  Even if an injury is not fully disabling, private insurers often 
find ways to terminate coverage rather than bearing consequential costs.142  For 
example, insurers (prior to PPACA) have placed caps on yearly and lifelong 
claims, and some have habitually terminated contracts when patients started 
consuming too much medical care.  Insurers have also refused coverage for 
preexisting conditions – including lasting effects of prior injuries – such that an 
insured might lose coverage for the injury when he or she changes jobs or 
otherwise switches insurance.  PPACA addresses all of these problems to one 
degree or another, though it might allow plans to terminate contracts in some 
cases.143 
 
140 See supra Part II.A.4. 
141 Who Is Eligible for Medicare?, MEDICARE, http://questions.medicare.gov/app/ 
answers/detail/a_id/10/kw/eligibility (last updated June 10, 2009). 
142 See Largest U.S. Health Insurer Rewarded Employees That Cancelled Coverage Of 
Sick Patients – Consumer Watchdog Calls on Congress to Ban Bonuses for Canceling, 
Delaying or Denying Medical Care, CONSUMERWATCHDOG.ORG (June 16, 2009),  http://ww 
w.consumerwatchdog.org/patients/articles/?storyId=27969.  
143 PPACA prohibits all group health plans from establishing lifetime limits from 
September 23, 2010 onwards or January 1, 2011 for calendar year plans.  Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10101(a), 124 Stat. 119, 883-84 (2010).  
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In the end, then, insurers’ incentive might be better aligned with patients’ 
interests, but because insurers often avoid the full costs of exposure to 
dangerous devices, they do not have a full incentive to avoid those costs.  
Insurers might, therefore, gather some information about devices and refuse 
coverage to the worst ones, but their investment in the regulatory project will 
likely fall short of what rational patients would be willing to spend to avoid 
bad devices. 
Of course, patients usually get to choose their doctors, hospitals, and 
insurance companies, so maybe patients could use competition within these 
groups to encourage monitoring.  In other words, patients could give more 
business to doctors, hospitals, and insurers that invest correctly in monitoring 
device malfunction.  But as in the case of ESI, patients are ill-positioned to 
enforce their preferences through their agents because patients lack the 
information necessary to hold their agents accountable.  Again, an individual 
patient who has a bad experience with a medical device does not have a 
credible story to tell about the device’s general safety or efficacy, which 
prevents patients from determining whether the doctors’, hospitals’, and 
insurers’ purchasing decisions are good or not.  Should the doctor have known 
that the device was risky and refused to provide it?  Or was the patient’s bad 
experience a rare or even unique event – a fluke?   
Even if patients incapable of judging individual devices knew that they 
should prefer insurance companies that actively monitor device safety and 
efficacy, it is not clear that they could determine which insurance companies 
were doing so – or at least which companies were doing so well.  First, 
insurance contracts are so long and complicated that it would be hard to 
discover which devices were and were not covered, and second, even if a 
consumer had clear lists of covered devices for various competing insurance 
contracts, it would be impossible to distinguish between good and bad lists 
 
Plans may not set annual limits from 2014 onwards.  Id.  Prior to 2014, however, plans may 
only establish restricted annual limits as defined by the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, to assure access to needed services with minimal impact on premiums.  Id.  With 
respect to benefits that are not “essential health benefits . . . a plan or issuer may impose 
annual or lifetime per-individual dollar limits on specific covered benefits.” Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act: Preexisting Condition Exclusions, Lifetime and Annual 
Limits, Rescissions, and Patient Protections, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,191 (June 28, 2010) (to be 
codified at 26 C.F.R. 54.9815–2711T, 29 C.F.R. 2590.715–2711, 45 C.F.R. 147.126).  
Finally, the PPACA forbids plans from rescinding coverage, except in case of fraud or 
misrepresentation.  Id. at 37,192.  PPACA also prohibits group and individual health plans 
from denying coverage based on an applicant’s preexisting condition.  Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, § 2704, 124 Stat. at 154-55.  Although this prohibition is generally 
effective for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2014, it became effective for plan 
years beginning on or after September 23, 2010 for enrollees who are under nineteen.  
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Preexisting Condition Exclusions, Lifetime and 
Annual Limits, Rescissions, and Patient Protections, 75 Fed. Reg. at 37,189-90. 
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(good and bad contracts) without knowing which devices should be covered.  
Again, that information is awfully hard for an individual consumer to gain. 
In the case of medical devices, then, the private market actors that are best 
situated to gather information about unsafe and ineffective devices probably do 
not have sufficient incentive to bear the considerable cost of doing so.  Even as 
agents for their patients, their incentives are not aligned because there is too 
much agency slack.  The market, thus, does not adequately protect patients 
from unsafe and ineffective devices. 
4. Medical Error 
As in the prior cases, there is a private market that could cabin medical 
negligence, but as in the prior cases, that market fails due to high information 
and agency costs.  In this story, doctors compete for insurance contracts 
(meaning that they compete for “preferred provider” status with large 
insurance companies),144 and they compete for individual patients.  (Some 
doctors choose not to compete for the insurance status and throw their fates to 
the individual patients’ choices; others compete for insurance status and then 
compete for patients within those insurer pools.)  But there are failures in the 
medical malpractice case that are again virtually identical to the failures in ESI 
and devices: individual experience is insufficient to draw conclusions about 
doctor quality, and the actors positioned to aggregate information – the 
insurers, in this case – are poor agents for their patients. 
Information Costs.  As in the prior stories, the primary information cost here 
is the need for aggregate data.  With respect to provider quality, one cannot 
draw reliable conclusions about an individual provider without knowing 
something about the provider’s overall injury and error rates.  All doctors make 
some mistakes, and many patients have bad outcomes through no fault of their 
provider’s.  But the information cost is actually a bit higher here than in the 
prior cases.  Even comprehensive data about a provider’s morbidity and 
mortality rates would not tell us enough about that provider’s quality because 
we would need to risk adjust those statistics – to account for the possibility that 
the individual provider habitually treats sicker, riskier patients who are simply 
more likely to experience bad outcomes.  That is, unlike with devices that 
regularly malfunction or MCOs that regularly deny claims, we cannot 
confidently conclude that a doctor that regularly fails to save her patients’ lives 
is a malfunctioning or abusive doctor.  We need to account for the possibility 
that any doctor treating the particular patients at issue would have had the same 
mortality rate because those patients were simply beyond medical help.145  
 
144 This point holds less true in states with “any willing provider” laws, which require 
MCOs to enlist any provider that wants to participate in the MCO’s “preferred provider” 
network, but even under those laws MCOs can place conditions on participating providers, 
presumably including quality controls. 
145 For an example of risk-adjusted morbidity and mortality rates, see David Emmons, 
Data on Employee Physician Profiling, 26 AM. HOSP. ASS’N J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 73 
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Such risk adjustment requires conclusions about causation that cannot be 
reached without close, expert analysis of individual outcomes.  Clearly, that 
task would outstrip an individual patient’s capacity, even if the patient had 
access to lots of data. 
Of course, one good reason to buy an MCO, such as a preferred provider 
organization, is to delegate the task of choosing doctors to an insurance 
company, which has better capacity to aggregate and analyze information.  
Insurance companies have good access to data about doctors’ successes across 
patients, reasonable access to data about individual patients’ risk factors, and 
excellent infrastructural capacity to gauge risk in the form of actuarial 
departments.  Perhaps, then, the private market could work to regulate doctor 
error if MCOs would engage in intensive quality controls, such as refusing 
reimbursement to – or cutting reimbursements for – doctors that have high 
error rates and whose errors seem attributable to doctor failure rather than 
patient risk.  As previously noted, CMS is leading the way on just such a 
project with its “pay for performance” and “never events” initiatives, and many 
private insurers have begun to adopt these programs.146   
That said, if insurers were truly to supplant medical malpractice as a 
regulatory mechanism, their reimbursement and other quality control programs 
would need to be rigorous and precise.  Insurers would need to be careful to 
deny payment for avoidable errors while continuing to pay for unavoidable 
ones and to refuse contracts to sloppy doctors while continuing to contract with 
doctors that take on high-risk patients.  As in the prior stories, such a system is 
possible but costly to implement and execute.147   
 
(1993) (outlining physician profiles created by the New York Department of Health).  
146 See Meredith B. Rosenthal et al., Early Experience With Pay-for-Performance: From 
Concept to Practice, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1788, 1788, 1792-93 (2005) (noting the 
growing adoption of pay-for-performance programs among private payers but concluding 
that the programs do little to increase provider quality); Devin S. Schindler, Never Events, 
Defensive Medicine and the Continued Federalization of Malpractice, 12 QUINNIPIAC 
HEALTH L.J. 209, 213-14 (2008-2009) (discussing CMS’ advent of “never-events” and the 
growing trend that doctors and hospitals are not reimbursed for provider-induced injuries);  
Maura Lerner, Minnesota Is First State With Policy to Stop Billing After Medical Errors, 
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.startribune.com/local/11590 
481.html (describing how Minnesota hospitals decided to stop charging for follow-up care 
caused by their own mistakes); Stephen Smith, Medical Mistakes No Longer Billable: Bold 
Steps Taken to Reduce Hospital Errors, BOSTON GLOBE, June 19, 2008, 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2008/06/19/medical_mistakes_no_longer_billabl
e/.  See generally Kristin Madison, The Law and Policy of Health Care Quality Reporting, 
31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 215 (2009) (discussing payers’ use of quality “report cards” as a 
possible means of improving provider quality). 
147 And, as noted, the systems that are in place so far do not seem to be working very 
well.  See, e.g., Rosenthal et al., supra note 146, at 1792-93 (concluding that current private 
insurers’ quality improvement programs do not work well for some kinds of providers); 
Tanenbaum, supra note 104, at 722-40 (reviewing empirical studies of pay-for-performance 
initiatives in CMS and private insurers and concluding that they generally have not effected 
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Agency Costs.  Consumers, of course, might be willing to bear the cost of 
such a system if it prevented patient injury, and if that were the case, then 
insurance companies would theoretically be able to pass the cost of their 
monitoring systems on to their patients in the form of higher premiums.  There 
are two problems, though, that stymie this possible market innovation.  First, 
patients would have a hard time evaluating the MCOs’ efforts and might 
therefore get hoodwinked into paying more for an MCO that doesn’t actually 
regulate quality well.  As noted in the ESI and device stories, MCO habits are 
hard to monitor, even for large group purchasers with lots of market power.148  
Second, patients might irrationally undervalue such a system out of optimism 
bias (either because every patient thinks she is unlikely to get sick or because 
every patient thinks her doctor is better than average).149  Once again, then, 
agency costs in the form of information asymmetry come into play; patients 
lack necessary information to demand and evaluate this service. 
Nor do insurance companies’ incentives align with their patients’ incentives 
sufficiently for the insurance companies to play a paternalistic role, monitoring 
doctor quality absent patient insistence and forcing patients to accept resulting 
costs.  Insurers’ incentives are somewhat aligned with their patients’, of 
course, since insurers suffer some costs from doctor error if they wind up 
paying for post-injury care.  But, as in the device case, insurers often avoid 
such costs by terminating coverage or by shifting patients to other payers.150  
Furthermore, even if insurance companies could never avoid paying for post-
injury care, they still would not have a full incentive to avoid patient injuries 
because the most the insurance company has to pay is the medical cost of 
treating the iatrogenic injury.  Insurers internalize less than the full monetary 
cost since they do not pay for lost productivity, and they internalize none of the 
non-monetary cost (like pain).151 
The insurance company thus does not have a full incentive to protect its 
patients from bad doctors.  Patients themselves are not good at evaluating 
insurance companies’ relevant policies because they are not good at judging 
doctor quality and because they are not easily capable of perceiving MCO 
habits.  Even if the market for health insurance were perfectly competitive, 
therefore, there still would be agency slack between insurers and patients. 
 
quality improvements). 
148 See supra Parts II.B.2 & II.B.3.  Furthermore, the agency slack between employers 
and employees, see supra Part II.B.2, might cause employers to under-invest in information 
about MCO quality controls. 
149 See generally Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk 
Perceptions to De-biasing Interventions, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 313 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002) 
(describing the persistence of optimism bias in patients’ judgments of their own health 
risks). 
150 See supra Part II.B.3. 
151 See generally INST. OF MED., supra note 11 (describing and quantifying the many 
costs of iatrogenic injury). 
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In the end, then, the private market, even with MCOs as agents for their 
patients, does not suffice to regulate doctor quality.  Individual patients are bad 
at evaluating individual doctors, and they are bad at evaluating MCO quality-
control programs. 
* * * 
Note that the four markets considered here – and, in fact, most if not all 
healthcare markets – suffer from the same two sets of transaction costs: 
information costs and agency costs.  Indeed, we can be more precise.  In the 
three private market cases, the informational problem has two components: (1) 
a need for aggregation of information across patients and doctors, and (2) a 
need for critical (and difficult) evaluation of causation in individual cases.  The 
agency costs also have two components in all four cases: (1) an asymmetry of 
information between patients and their agents, and (2) a misalignment of 
incentives between patients and their agents (or a failure of agents to 
internalize their principals’ full costs).  In all four cases, these information and 
agency costs cause healthcare markets to fail, necessitating regulatory 
intervention. 
III. FROM STATE JUDICIAL TO FEDERAL EXECUTIVE ENFORCEMENT 
Given that healthcare markets require legal regulation to operate efficiently, 
we ought now to ask the comparative institutional competence question: 
Which legal entity is best situated to correct healthcare’s information and 
agency costs?  The Supreme Court’s and state legislatures’ decisions to 
eliminate private enforcement suggest part of the answer: not state courts.  And 
the presence of the alternative regulators suggests the other part of the answer: 
federal agencies.  In all four of the stories considered here, the assault on 
litigation and the presence of federal regulatory alternatives present an 
opportunity.  Without much statutory change or congressional action, we can 
fill our enforcement vacuums by embracing the trend from state judicial to 
federal executive regulation, further empowering the federal executive to fulfill 
its regulatory role. 
Importantly, the point here is not that executive agencies are already doing a 
good job at regulating.  In fact, our experience with federal executive 
regulation so far might well give readers pause in accepting my suggestions 
here.  But the central thesis of this Article is that a regulator that can operate 
nation-wide through ex ante regulation has greater institutional capacity to 
address healthcare’s particular market failures than any regulator that must 
operate case-by-case through ex post evaluation.  That simple theoretical point, 
which seems uncontroversial in itself, strongly suggests that we should invest 
in strengthening our federal executive system of healthcare regulation rather 
than reverting to our state judicial system. 
This Part fleshes out the reallocation trend as it arises in our four stories and 
considers the advantages and disadvantages of the shift for Medicaid, ESI, 
devices, and medical malpractice. 
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A. The Reallocation Trend 
The migration of regulatory authority from judicial to executive forums is 
quite clear in our four stories; in all four, the problem is that private litigation 
(i.e., judicial action) is no longer available, and in all four, one apparent 
solution is to let the alternative regulators (executive entities) supplant private 
litigation.  The migration of authority from state to federal forums is clear in 
two of our stories and real (though less clear) in the other two; the device and 
ESI cases, premised as they are on federal preemption of state law, present 
clean shifts of authority from state to federal forums, while the Medicaid and 
medical malpractice cases represent more muddled shifts in the general 
direction of federal forums. 
1. Separation of Powers 
In limiting private enforcement, the Supreme Court and state legislatures 
also effectively limit judicial enforcement.  The point may be obvious, but: 
Without individual lawsuits, the judiciary is powerless to make or alter 
healthcare regulations.  The judicial branch’s regulatory power – in common 
law systems by creating rules and in statutory regimes by interpreting them – is 
always contingent on case-by-case adjudication, the resolution of private 
litigation.  And in all four cases considered here, private litigation has 
disappeared in favor of executive enforcement through rulemaking.  Courts can 
no longer hear any challenges to Medicaid compliance, any claims for 
consequential or punitive damages against abusive employer-sponsored 
MCOs, any allegations of dangerousness against preapproved medical devices, 
or any large claims for noneconomic or punitive damages against negligent 
providers. 
That said, the elimination of private causes of action – if we shift from pure 
litigation to executive enforcement – does not completely obliterate the 
judiciary’s role in the regulatory regime.  First, administrative agencies’ rules, 
regulations, and interpretations are subject to Article III review for both 
procedural and substantive compliance.152  Second, in the four cases 
considered here, as Part III.B will argue, the relevant agencies would be well 
advised to establish adjudicatory processes for individual claims, which would 
allow for private, individual challenges to executive decision-making as well 
as private claims for compensation.  The agencies’ resolution of such claims 
would then also be subject to Article III review. 
The judiciary will therefore retain some role in these four regulatory regimes 
even if the executive fully displaces private litigation as the regulatory 
mechanism, but the judiciary’s role will be different and lesser.  Courts will 
owe deference to many of the agency rules and adjudications that reach Article 
 
152 See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 89-554, §§ 701-706, 80 Stat. 
392, 392 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2008)); Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“Such legislative regulations are given controlling 
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”). 
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III review,153 and many of the quotidian regulatory decisions that might have 
belonged to the judiciary in the past will never reach the courts, having been 
sufficiently settled through administrative processes.  The judiciary will 
therefore retain a role as a mediator of executive regulation, but it will not be a 
creator of regulatory rules. 
The judiciary, thus, has largely ceded to the executive the power to enforce 
federal Medicaid rules, ESI contracts, and medical device safety, and the state 
legislatures have largely shifted the power to enforce medical malpractice 
standards out of the judiciary. 
2. Federalism 
The federalist shift is obvious for ESI and medical devices, though less so 
for Medicaid and medical malpractice.  In the regulatory regimes for ESI and 
medical devices, private enforcement mechanisms have disappeared only 
because the Supreme Court held that federal law preempts state law (even 
where federal law fails to provide its own private right of action).  Davila and 
Riegel prohibit states from setting rules for MCO negligence and for products 
liability, leaving that responsibility entirely with the federal government, with 
only ERISA and the FDCA – federal statutes – available for constraining MCO 
and manufacturer abuses. 
In Medicaid, the entity responsible for enforcing the statute prior to 
Gonzaga was usually a federal entity; federal courts could have heard (and 
heard most if not all of) the § 1983 suits against state Medicaid agencies.154  
Regulatory authority itself, therefore, did not as clearly shift away from state 
governments in the Medicaid story since state courts were never solely 
responsible for enforcing the statute.  But the effect of Gonzaga has been to 
absolve state agencies from liability or responsibility for their violations of the 
federal statute and to shift responsibility for the statute’s enforcement entirely 
to the federal agency, CMS.  The story therefore represents a shift of 
responsibility from state to federal entities, just not the same shift of active 
regulatory oversight that is at issue in the ESI and device cases. 
In medical malpractice, the state legislatures have disarmed their own 
common law systems without proactively encouraging the federal government 
to step in.  The effect, however, has been to leave CMS, through its 
reimbursement formulae, primarily responsible for ensuring provider quality.  
Furthermore, the states’ actions in the medical malpractice arena have 
accomplished little if anything in terms of improving provider quality, which 
has emboldened Congress to step in with federal medical malpractice reform 
 
153 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
154 See Donenberg, supra note 18, at 1520 n.131 (citing Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n v. 
Houston, 283 F.3d 531, 543-44 (3d Cir. 2002); Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. 
Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 927-28 (5th Cir. 2000); Visiting Nurse Ass’n v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 
1004 n.7 (1st Cir. 1996); Ark Med. Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 528 (8th Cir. 
1993)). 
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proposals.155  The legislative caps have therefore effected a shift in 
governance, though probably unintentionally and certainly indirectly. 
In all four stories, therefore, the federal government has taken over large 
swaths of regulatory responsibility from the states. 
B. Advantages and Disadvantage of the Shift 
The best regulatory forum in each of these cases will be the one that is best 
situated to address and correct the information and agency costs that confound 
healthcare markets.  In all four stories considered here – and probably in most 
healthcare contexts – federal executive forums have significant advantages 
over state judicial forums in the project of correcting information and agency 
costs.  Most importantly, federal agencies will be significantly better than state 
courts at aggregating and evaluating information.  That said, state judicial 
forums might retain some advantage in correcting agency costs, and any future 
design changes to administrative regulation ought to try to minimize the 
regulators’ agency failures. 
1. Information Costs 
Federal executive forums bring two significant advantages to the project of 
gathering and evaluating information: expertise and scale.  As Part II.B made 
clear, the biggest informational problem in healthcare markets is the need to 
aggregate data.  This need arises primarily from causal uncertainty that 
pervades healthcare stories; in an individual case, we can rarely determine with 
confidence the cause of a patient’s bad outcome.  It might have been provider 
sloppiness, device malfunction, or MCO abuse, or it might have been simply 
that the patient was sick and didn’t get better.  Distinguishing among possible 
causes requires a high level of medical expertise. 
That expertise, then, is the first advantage of executive forums over judicial 
forums.  If DOL took over ESI regulation, the department created for 
evaluating MCO claims processing would, over time, become expert in the 
project, as DOL staffers would develop skill at identifying abusive claim 
denials.  The same would be true for an FDA department devoted to 
monitoring devices and a CMS department devoted to evaluating provider 
quality: the staff of those departments presumably would come in with some 
expertise and would develop even greater expertise over time.  This 
institutional learning contrasts starkly with lay juries that have been charged, 
one panel at a time, with evaluating plaintiffs’ individual claims.  Even if 
expert testimony worked flawlessly to inform lay jurors,156 the jurors’ 
evaluations of that testimony would be less sophisticated and more error-prone 
 
155 Moncrieff, supra note 4, at 857-58 (describing congressional and presidential interest 
in medical malpractice reform). 
156 Which it certainly doesn’t seem to do.  See Christopher T. Robertson, Blind Expertise, 
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 177-78 (2010) (discussing how biased expert witnesses deprive 
factfinders of a clear view of the facts, leading to wrong decisions). 
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than expert bureaucrats’ own evaluations of individual cases, especially 
because the adversarial process encourages countervailing testimony that 
jurors might have a particularly hard time judging. 
Of course, even when experts are charged with evaluating individual 
outcomes, their conclusions are limited to individual cases and might still be 
error-prone.  From a single story of device malfunction, the most expert of 
experts may not be able to conclude with confidence that the device was 
responsible for the injury, and the expert certainly would hesitate to conclude 
from a single story that a device is generally unsafe and should be recalled or 
relabeled.  Likewise for a single story of provider negligence, from which we 
might not be able to conclude that the provider was solely to blame for the 
injury and from which we ought not to conclude that the provider is generally 
sloppy and should be punished; and likewise for a single story of wrongful 
benefits denial, from which we might not be able to conclude that the MCO 
was to blame and ought not to conclude that the MCO is generally abusive and 
should be put out of business.157  In order to draw final conclusions, we need to 
gather several stories – to aggregate data.  That process of gathering large 
swaths of data allows evaluation of trends and also helps to smooth error that 
might occur in expert evaluations of individual cases.  Indeed, the final 
evaluation drawn from a body of data becomes increasingly likely to be correct 
as the body of data grows, as long as the evaluating experts that produce the 
data are (on average) better than random in their individual evaluations.158 
Hence the second advantage of federal executive forums (and the true 
advantage of federal over state forums): scale.  It would be theoretically 
possible, of course, for a state court to watch for repeat offenders – for MCOs, 
devices, and providers that get sued often – and perhaps to assign high punitive 
damages to those repeat offenders in an effort to put them out of business.  But 
an individual state court has limited jurisdiction and does not communicate all 
that well with other jurisdictions.159  A court’s ability to aggregate information 
 
157 Admittedly, the tort system does not generally draw such wholesale conclusions; 
liability rules do not put manufacturers, MCOs, or providers out of business.  Instead, the 
damages recoverable in tort are specifically designed to allow injuries where efficient, such 
that a device manufacturer, MCO, or doctor will go out of business only if held liable on 
several occasions.  
158 See MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Theory 
of Decision-Making, in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS 33, 52-55 (Keith Michael Baker 
ed., 1976) (stating a mathematical theorem that voting groups become increasingly likely to 
choose correct results as the groups grow in membership, as long as the groups’ members 
are, on average, more likely to vote for the right answer than the wrong one); see also 
Adrian Vermeule, Forward: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13 
(2009) (“[W]here a group votes sincerely on two alternatives, one of which is correct, and 
the members of the group are even slightly more likely to be right than wrong, then as the 
number of members in the group increases, the probability that a majority vote of the group 
is correct tends towards certainty.”). 
159 States, of course, have high courts that can gather and see cases from all jurisdictions 
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across stories is therefore limited.  A federal agency, by contrast, gathers 
stories nation-wide.   
Furthermore, a federal agency can take note of any and all relevant 
information, including, for example, stories from other countries in the case of 
internationally marketed devices.  This point presents another stark contrast 
with judicial systems, which must constrain their review to the information 
provided by the parties.  Even in an adversarial system in which the parties 
have incentives to present as much information as possible, the parties’ ability 
to collect and present information will be resource constrained; they will be 
able to collect only the information that they can afford to gather, and they will 
likely choose to dedicate much of their resources to trial strategy rather than 
information gathering.  By contrast, executive agencies that have information 
aggregation and expert regulation as their primary mandate will be more likely 
to expend their resources on gathering and monitoring data.   
In short, because the agency sees all individual stories in the nation and 
because the agency has a greater incentive than litigants to gather information, 
the federal regulator can reach more accurate conclusions160 and faster 
conclusions than the state court.  Federal executive agencies can therefore take 
more decisive action. 
A word about Medicaid: The informational problem in Medicaid is 
somewhat different from the informational problems in the other three stories. 
For Medicaid, the problem is not that aggregate information is needed.  
Instead, the informational need for correcting Medicaid violations includes 
knowledge of the complicated web of federal regulations, understanding of the 
interactions between state and federal decision-makers, and appreciation for 
the programmatic tradeoffs that are necessary in running public insurance for 
the poor.  Under the Equal Access Provision, for example, litigants ask courts 
to determine whether a given reimbursement rate reduction will cause 
Medicaid recipients to lose access to needed services, but determining the 
long-term effects of a reimbursement rate reduction is difficult if not 
impossible for a single, non-expert court.161  The problem is exacerbated by the 
need to consider programmatic tradeoffs that become necessary in the face of 
budgetary restrictions: Will Medicaid eligible people have better access to 
services if rates are low and benefits are generous, or vice versa?  Will public 
health policy be better if lots of people are covered but are given only limited 
public benefits or if only the very poorest people are covered but are given 
 
in the state, but they are not usually in the habit of punishing repeat tortfeasors more harshly 
because of the repetition.  Furthermore, although it would not be difficult for one state court 
to see what other state courts have decided, they are certainly not bound by one another’s 
law and probably do not bother to research foreign jurisdictions’ experiences and decisions. 
160 See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
161 Moncrieff, supra note 1, at 687-88 (discussing the difficulty that courts faced in 
determining whether Medicaid patients actually had “equal access” to healthcare services). 
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generous public benefits?  These systemic evaluations are better made in 
expert agencies than in generalist courts.  
In all four stories federal executive regulators have significant advantages 
over state judicial regulators in their ability to correct informational failures.  
In the three private market stories, a single expert body, operating nation-wide, 
will do the best job of identifying and punishing bad actors.  In Medicaid, 
agencies will do a better job than either courts or voters at making decisions 
about complicated policy tradeoffs. 
2. Agency Costs 
With respect to agency cost, the benefits of federal executive regulation are 
less clear.  Individual enforcement in state courts might better correct those 
costs by allowing individual victims to stand up for themselves (eliminating 
the need for an agent), while federal executive enforcement might replicate 
agency failures if it falls prey to interest group capture.  That said, state courts 
are not immune to capture; healthcare regulations might be less subject to 
capture than fields like telecommunications and environmental law; and, to the 
extent that capture is a problem, federal agencies can use individual 
enforcement mechanisms to counteract (at least somewhat) their agency 
failures. 
As discussed in Part II.B, the agency failures in healthcare markets occur for 
two reasons: an asymmetry of information and a misalignment of incentives 
between principals (patients) and agents (insurers and providers).  To correct 
those failures, a legal regulator should not itself be subject to them.  But as 
public choice theory makes clear, all legal regulators are at least somewhat 
subject to both of them.  Since we have a choice between two possible 
regulators, though, the relevant question is which of the two – state courts or 
federal agencies – does a better job along these dimensions. 
On the first, information asymmetry, state courts probably do better than 
federal agencies, but to the extent that that’s true, it’s more of a curse than a 
blessing.  A single judicial proceeding is almost entirely transparent; the 
litigants are involved in the case from the word go, and the court decides the 
case based entirely on the information that the litigants present.162  Litigants 
have easy access to (indeed, are usually given proactive notice of) all 
information provided and arguments presented on both sides, including any 
information that non-parties present, as through amicus briefs.  As a result, all 
vested interests (patients, payers, and providers) can see the decision-making 
process of state courts without much difficulty, even if they are not particularly 
good at evaluating the big-picture regulatory quality of those decisions, and 
they can hold elected judges accountable for their regulatory decisions.  
Furthermore, a court’s decision in a single case, if it will have precedential 
effect, must be published with reasons given for the decision.  Parties are 
 
162 See infra Part IV.B.1 for further discussion of this function of private litigation and 
for the suggestion that the function can be replicated in agencies. 
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therefore able to monitor not only the judiciary’s resolutions of their particular 
conflicts but also the judiciary’s overall regulatory approach to the relevant 
regime.  
The federal executive, by contrast, makes its decisions based on expert 
evaluations and aggregated data that are hard for patients to understand.  And 
even though the Administrative Procedure Act forces a certain degree of 
transparency in executive proceedings,163 affected parties are not as intimately 
involved in executive regulatory decisions as they are in judicial ones.  
Furthermore, because executive decision-making is open for comment from 
any and all parties that might be interested in the decision, the regulatory 
process often involves far too much information for any single party to read 
and evaluate.  Finally, regulatory decisions, unlike judicial ones, do not have to 
be explained.  The executive is not required to publish an equivalent to the 
judicial opinion: a public expression of its logic for reaching a particular 
regulatory outcome.164  Executive agencies, thus, may have more leeway – less 
accountability – in regulating. 
The state courts’ success here, though, is not necessarily something to 
celebrate; it is merely the flip side of the courts’ failure to aggregate 
information.  True, state courts make transparent decisions based entirely on 
individuals’ presentations.  But that’s exactly why they don’t do a very good 
job of reaching optimal decisions for healthcare regulation.  An agency’s 
relatively opaque process of evaluating systemic problems and offering 
systemic solutions is, at worst, a necessary evil in a regime as complicated as 
healthcare.  Information asymmetry is the price we pay for better-informed 
healthcare regulation. 
On the second dimension of agency cost – misaligned incentives – state 
courts may do a bit better than federal agencies, but the state courts’ advantage 
might be less significant in healthcare than in other regulatory regimes like 
telecommunications and environmental law.  Here, the biggest risk is capture.  
The fear is that moneyed interests like insurers, doctors, and manufacturers can 
gain disproportionate influence over elected officials, especially as compared 
to dispersed, unorganized interests like patients.  Regulators’ incentive, then, 
would be to please the organized lobbies rather than to serve the public 
interest, creating a misalignment of incentives between patients and federal 
agencies.165  State judges, of course, are usually elected and therefore lack the 
 
163 See generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 543, 586-87 (2000). 
164 That said, administrative law provides significant incentives for agencies to develop 
records of their decision-making processes and to give public reasons for their decisions.  
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237-38 (2000) (holding that only formal 
rules, which require creation of a public record, will be entitled to judicial deference). 
165 See Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After 
Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1199 (2003) (“Big American business firms are not discrete 
and insular minorities.  They have exceptional access to influence in legislatures, 
administrative agencies, and the courts through government advisory commissions, trade 
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political insulation of Article III judges,166 but they might be less of a target 
than federal executive regulators simply because they make dispersed, case-by-
case decisions.  That is, because courts do not usually effect broad-sweeping 
regulatory change, even elected state judges might not attract the attention or 
the pressure of interest groups, at least not nearly to the same extent as federal 
agencies. 
That said, even in individual litigation and even in litigation before insulated 
judges, the playing field is not exactly level.  Just as moneyed interests can 
gain an advantage in wholesale regulation by donating to officials’ campaigns 
and by monitoring regulatory processes, so too can these interests gain an 
advantage in litigation by outspending their individual opponents – by hiring 
better lawyers and fancier expert witnesses, filing more motions, dragging out 
trials, etc.167  This failure is not a traditional capture story, but it is a similar 
story of process failure that causes a similar distortion in regulatory incentives.  
State courts might well respond more favorably to organized interests than to 
disorganized ones, and they might therefore do only a marginally better job 
than agencies of basing regulatory decisions on the general public interest.168 
Additionally, there may be reason to believe that the traditional capture 
story is less likely to be realized in healthcare than in other regulatory regimes.  
In typical regulated industries, there is a clear division between the moneyed 
interests and the public interest.  In telecommunications law, one side of the 
policy debate is comprised of the regulated firms, which are organized and 
moneyed, while the other side is comprised of consumers, who are dispersed 
and unorganized.  In environmental law, one side is comprised of big business 
polluters while the other is comprised of those that suffer from environmental 
degradation – a group that has become increasingly organized and moneyed 
over time but that still lacks the financial wherewithal and incentives of the 
polluting industrial lobby.   
 
associations, lobbies, and lawyers.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political 
Faith, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 959, 961 (1997) (discussion of public choice theory in 
relation to business lobbies influence on regulators); Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future 
of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1785 (1998) (“[P]owerful 
business lobbies may induce regulators to declare as safe products that are not in fact 
safe.”). 
166 Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for 
an Elected Rather Than Appointed Judiciary (Univ. of Chic. Law Sch., Olin Ctr. for Law & 
Econ. Working Paper Series,  No. 357, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008989 
(observing that most state judges are elected, not appointed). 
167 See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial 
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 77 (1991) (“Small intensely interested groups are still likely to 
spend more on their litigation efforts than any large diffuse groups opposing them.”). 
168 We have evidence of this kind of distortion in medical malpractice litigation, where 
juries are significantly more likely to err on the doctor’s side than on the patient’s side.  See 
Studdert & Mello, supra note 20, at S49-S53. 
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In healthcare, by contrast, there are organized and moneyed interests on both 
sides of the policy divide.  In the medical malpractice example, doctors (an 
organized lobby) might prefer professional self-regulation to anything that 
CMS would offer and might therefore push the agency towards a laissez-faire 
approach.  But payers, including private insurance companies that are just as 
organized and moneyed as doctors, have incentives to minimize patient injuries 
and might therefore push CMS in the opposite direction, advocating hefty 
regulatory intervention.  Likewise for ESI, MCOs would favor laissez-faire, 
but employers would favor regulation; for medical devices, manufacturers 
would favor laissez-faire, but payers and providers would favor regulation; and 
for Medicaid, states (a surprisingly organized lobby) would favor laissez-faire, 
but providers strongly favor intervention.  The relevant agencies in these four 
stories – and in most healthcare regimes – would therefore be subject to 
competing interests that would pull in opposite directions.  It is possible that 
this environment would prevent the agency from falling capture to any given 
interest and would leave the agency freer than average to pursue the public 
interest.  
Even if this image of a regulatory tug-of-war – or the conclusion of public-
interest-oriented regulation – is too simplistic or rosy, it is possible for 
regulatory design to minimize some of the agency problems that executive 
regulators might face.  Most importantly, the federal executive can and should 
allow individual administrative claims.  An individual claims process would 
allow patients to inform the executive of their experiences, to have more direct 
contact with the decision-making process, and to influence the development of 
the regulatory environment in the same small way that the state courts allow 
them to do, without requiring that actual decisions be made by generalist juries 
and judges.  Such a process would give individuals some power to act as their 
own agents, as they do in state courts, and it would allow self-interested parties 
to present an informational record to expert decision-makers.169  If we ever do 
shift entirely to federal executive enforcement in these stories or others like 
them, federal agencies ought therefore to establish administrative claims, like 
those already available to Medicare beneficiaries and Social Security Disability 
recipients, for example. 
In sum, state courts might do better than federal administrators at 
internalizing and representing the public interest if they are less subject to 
capture than federal agencies, but their advantages are marginal (if not non-
existent in the unique world of healthcare), come at the expense of 
informational deficits, and can be at least partially overcome through 
administrative claims processes.  For these four stories, therefore, courts might 
be slightly better for correcting the markets’ agency failures, but that 
advantage may not be worth its cost. 
 
169 Such a process would therefore replicate many of the informational successes of state 
courts.  See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
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IV. WHAT NEXT? 
Federal executive agencies, thus, bring many theoretical advantages to the 
project of healthcare regulation.  But that point alone does not answer the 
question of how best to solve the current enforcement vacuum.  There are three 
possible regimes that we must consider, and the choice among them turns on 
empirical questions about the cost-benefit tradeoff between state judicial 
regulation and federal executive regulation.   
First, we could allow concurrent regulatory authority, gaining the 
advantages of federal executive regulation without losing any positive role that 
state judicial regulation plays.  In other words, we could encourage the federal 
executive to fill its regulatory role while also re-empowering the judiciary, at 
least in the federal courts if not in the state courts.170  Second, we could allow 
the judiciary to play a much more limited role than it did before the Supreme 
Court’s intervention, providing compensation to injured parties without 
engaging in the regulatory aspects of tort.  Such a system might depend on 
courts’ acceptance of a regulatory compliance defense as an absolute bar to 
liability.171  Third, we could completely eliminate the judicial role and shift all 
regulatory functions to the federal executive. 
This Part will reject the first option, offering compliance and error costs as a 
reason to preserve and maybe enhance limits on the judiciary’s role.  It will 
then consider the other two options together, acknowledging the positive 
functions of the judiciary but suggesting that we could create a more efficient 
system by replicating those functions in the executive rather than retaining a 
limited judicial role. 
A. Concurrent Authority 
1. The Possibility of Concurrent Authority 
Before we get to compliance and error costs, we must first consider whether 
judicial authority can be reinstated after the Supreme Court’s holdings and 
state legislatures’ decisions.  The answer, of course, is that it can be in all four 
stories, though it requires congressional action in one story, executive or 
congressional action in two, and state legislative action in the last. 
For Medicaid, the Supreme Court’s holding applied to § 1983, holding that 
the general right of action provided in that statute did not allow private 
enforcement of Spending Clause conditions against state agencies unless those 
conditions clearly intended to create and confer enforceable rights.  
 
170 See Edward Alan Miller, Federal Administration and Judicial Oversight of Medicaid: 
Policy Legacies and Tandem Institutions under the Boren Amendment, 38 PUBLIUS: J. OF 
FEDERALISM 315, 328-29 (2008) (celebrating the combination of judicial and regulatory 
oversight under the predecessor of the Equal Access Provision). 
171 See, e.g., Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in 
Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147, 2165 (1999) (arguing in favor of a regulatory 
compliance defense for drug and device torts). 
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(Remember, it was not even a Medicaid case that caused the vacuum here; it 
was FERPA.)172  Congress, however, could insert an explicit right of action 
into the Medicaid statute or could amend § 1983 to allow private enforcement 
of Spending statute conditions.  (Either of those options would create a right of 
action in federal rather than state courts, but either amendment would 
reauthorize judicial regulation of Medicaid conditions.) 
For ESI, Congress could amend ERISA to allow for consequential and 
punitive damages against insurers.  It could do so either by amending the 
“equitable relief” restriction in ERISA’s federal cause of action or by 
amending ERISA’s preemption provisions to allow for state tort suits against 
employer-sponsored insurers.  Indeed, Congress came very close to passing the 
latter amendment in 2001, when the so-called Patients’ Bill of Rights passed 
both chambers but died in conference committee.173  Alternatively, without 
congressional action, the Department of Labor could issue a formal rule, 
establishing that ERISA’s “equitable relief” provision allows for consequential 
and punitive damages in federal court.174 
The story is the same for medical devices.  Congress could either create a 
federal right of action for device-related injuries or amend the FDCA’s 
preemption provision to allow for state tort suits.  In this case, too, it is 
possible that the federal executive could change the meaning of the preemption 
provision by issuing a formal rule that state tort suits are not “requirements” 
for device safety.  Given that FDA has changed its position on that question 
several times in the past, though, the Supreme Court might deem the 
interpretation to be unreasonable and thereby refuse deference.175  In any 
event, the provision could certainly be changed, whether or not the change 
would require congressional action. 
For medical error, the reinstatement of full judicial authority would require 
the state legislatures to repeal their damages caps.  It is also possible that 
Congress could create a federal cause of action for medical torts, empowering 
the federal judiciary rather than state judiciaries, though such an approach 
would be vulnerable to constitutional challenges, particularly on the ground 
that medical practice does not constitute “interstate commerce.”176 
 
172 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 273 (2001). 
173 Miller, supra note 86, at 1303. 
174 See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
175 Under the second step of deference analysis, the court asks whether the agency’s 
interpretation is “reasonable.”  See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 845 
(1983).  If it is not, the court will not defer.  Id.  
176 See Perry H. Apelbaum & Samara T. Ryder, The Third Wave of Federal Tort Reform: 
Protecting the Public or Pushing the Constitutional Envelope?, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 591, 593 (1999) (observing that federal medical malpractice reform raises difficult 
constitutional questions); Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudence and National 
Tort Reform, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 475, 534 (2002) (suggesting that medical malpractice 
might not be “economic activity” that can be subject to federal regulation under the 
Commerce Clause); Collin Sult, Note, Questionable Medicine – Why Federal Medical 
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In any event, there is no impenetrable barrier to the reauthorization of 
judicial regulation in these four regimes – or in any regime.  Congress and state 
legislatures can certainly create rights of action to re-empower private 
enforcement.  Furthermore, a decision to re-empower the judiciary would not 
be fundamentally incompatible with a decision to encourage the relevant 
executive agencies to play a greater regulatory role.  We could, then, allow 
both branches to have full regulatory authority, with punitive damages 
available in courts and regulatory oversight vested in agencies.  Other 
regulatory regimes follow this model with success,177 and there is no inherent 
structural problem with allowing the branches to exercise concurrent authority. 
2. The Problems with Concurrent Authority 
To argue that we should allow concurrent authority for these four stories of 
health law, however, would be to miss the point.  State judicial bodies are not 
simply failing to get the job done; their flaws are actively detrimental to the 
system, creating high and unnecessary costs for regulated entities.  For our four 
stories and probably for healthcare generally, state judicial regulation creates 
high compliance costs (a problem with state regulation) and injects high error 
costs (a problem with judicial regulation). 
Compliance Costs.  The first problem with state judicial regulation hinges 
on the state-ness of it: With fifty independent jurisdictions creating rules, some 
regulated entities will suffer higher-than-necessary compliance costs.  This 
problem is, of course, the motivation behind the preemption rules in ERISA 
and in the FDCA.  Medical device manufacturers benefit significantly from 
regulatory uniformity since they sell their devices nation-wide, and employers 
benefit significantly from such uniformity since they employ labor and provide 
benefits across jurisdictions (if not nation-wide).  Given that federal agencies 
have authority to take over from the states and have superior capacity to the 
states’ to reach regulatory optimality, there is no good reason to continue 
suffering the compliance costs that come with state judicial regulation.  Even if 
state courts were simply settling claims for compensation, they would 
 
Malpractice Reform May Be Unconstitutional, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 195, 198 (2005) (expressing 
skepticism about the constitutionality of federal medical malpractice reform under the 
“Supreme Court’s more recent pronouncements defining the scope of congressional power 
under the Commerce Clause”).  
177 Environmental law and its regulatory regime is one example of such success.  See 
Lois Schiffer & Timothy Dowling, Remark, Reflections on the Role of the Courts in 
Environmental Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 327, 331-32 (1997) (attributing the effectiveness of 
environmental policy to both legislation, such as the Clean Air Act, and to the courts for 
their “vigorous enforcement and resolution of exactly what the new [environmental] statutes 
required from the executive and from private parties”).  But see Thomas O. McGarity, The 
Complementary Roles of Common Law Courts and Federal Agencies in Producing and 
Using Policy-Relevant Scientific Information, 37 ENVTL. L. 1027, 1044 (2007) (exploring 
the limits on communication between common law courts and EPA, and suggesting reforms 
to enhance information exchange). 
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necessarily impose regulatory duties for manufacturers and employers that 
might vary across jurisdictions, necessarily deciding when compensatory 
damages are due and when they are not.  Concurrent jurisdiction between state 
and federal regulators, thus, does not solve the uniformity need for 
manufacturers and employers. 
Of course, that uniformity need is less acute for medical malpractice178 and 
Medicaid.  In those stories, variation among states probably would not be a 
significant problem since providers tend to operate in a single state.  Even in a 
country with fifty different legal regimes, individual providers (including 
hospitals) would need to learn and to abide by only one set of negligence rules 
and only one set of Medicaid reimbursement formulae because their practice is 
ordinarily confined to a single state.179  Similarly, liability insurers probably do 
not benefit much from national medical malpractice standards since they write 
state-specific policies for actuarial reasons.  If compliance costs were the only 
reason to eliminate state judicial regulation, then, we might consider 
maintaining state courts’ role in medical malpractice and state agencies’ 
answerability for Medicaid. 
Error Costs.  The second problem with state judicial regulation – and the 
problem with allowing federal judicial regulation rather than moving entirely 
to the executive – hinges on the judicial-ness of it: Juries and judges make bad 
decisions when confronted with single healthcare cases, leading to systemic 
error costs.180  This problem is significant for all four of our stories, as should 
be apparent from the pervasive discussion of information costs.  For ESI, 
devices, and malpractice, the source of the error has been well-canvassed in the 
Article so far: Courts (especially juries) do a bad job of evaluating causation.181  
As a result, they issue both false positives and false negatives.  Good MCOs, 
devices, and providers get punished, but bad ones go free; inevitable injuries 
get compensated while preventable ones do not.  Regulated entities then invest 
in avoiding liability in an arbitrary system, a wasteful investment since 
arbitrary rules fail to incentivize greater safety or welfare.182   
For Medicaid, too, the problem with courts is that they lack the wide-angle 
lens necessary to evaluate something like a reimbursement rate reduction.  The 
systemic evaluations necessary to shape a Medicaid program are better made in 
 
178 Moncrieff, supra note 4, at 859-61 (reciting the arguments against a uniformity need 
for medical malpractice). 
179 It is a reasonable question, however, whether this is an artifact of fifty different legal 
regimes – whether nation-wide providers (perhaps on a Kaiser-like model, but across state 
lines) would emerge if the federal government took over regulation. 
180 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006) (discussing the limits 
of judicial decision-making and urging a greater executive role in interpreting statutes). 
181 See supra Part II.B.2 & Part II.B.4. 
182 This point is perhaps best-known in the malpractice context, where arbitrary litigation 
rules incentivize defensive medicine on the part of individual providers rather than 
appropriate precaution on the part of systemic entities. 
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expert agencies than in generalist courts, and the cost of error could be 
significant if, for example, courts unwittingly move Medicaid beneficiaries 
into emergency rooms. 
* * * 
Importantly, the problem with concurrent authority here is not at all inherent 
to concurrency.183  The problem is that state and judicial decision-making, 
whether occurring alongside federal executive decision-making or not, imposes 
costs on the system.  Those costs might be worth bearing if state courts were 
the only option for regulation or were a significantly better option than their 
available alternatives.  But given the presence of alternative regulators with 
superior expertise in the federal executive, we might be able to avoid the 
compliance and error costs that come with state judicial rulemaking by vesting 
exclusive authority in federal agencies. 
B. Exclusive Executive Authority 
Ought we, then, to shift exclusively to executive authority?  As noted, the 
groundwork for that shift is already laid; in each of our four regulatory 
regimes, some federal agency already has authority to regulate.  But shifting to 
exclusive executive authority would eliminate any benefits that we get out of 
private litigation.  Furthermore, the federal agencies that are poised to regulate 
in our four stories have not (yet) been doing a good job of playing the 
regulatory role.  We must therefore ask two questions: (1) Are the benefits of 
exclusive executive regulation worth their costs, namely the lost values of 
private litigation in the state judicial system? (2) What needs to be done to 
motivate and optimize federal executive regulation of Medicaid, ESI, medical 
devices, and medical malpractice?  This part of the Article will address these 
questions in turn, particularly considering whether courts should retain a 
limited, compensatory role in healthcare regulation. 
1. The Values of Private Litigation 
The first potential problem with shifting authority fully to the federal 
executive is that the shift might (unless carefully designed) sacrifice the 
benefits of private litigation.  The question, then, is what we get out of private 
litigation and whether those benefits are worth preserving, either by retaining a 
limited judicial role or by replicating the benefits in executive forums.  
Although there are several such benefits for healthcare regulation, a carefully 
designed administrative system can replicate them and might be able to 
improve on them. 
Information Gathering.  Perhaps the most relevant advantage of private 
litigation for present purposes is that it exposes information about private 
 
183 The problem here is not merely one of “coordinating sanctions” between the 
executive and the judiciary, as a recent manuscript puts it.  See Logue, supra note 14. 
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parties’ behavior – information that administrative agencies currently have a 
hard time gathering and that, once revealed through litigation, can be important 
to executive regulation.184  Although agencies currently have some 
investigatory tools and certainly engage in some information-gathering,185 the 
discovery process in private litigation provides a much more extensive toolbox 
for information-gathering than any currently available to agencies.186   
This point might seem inconsistent with the central claims of this paper – 
particularly the claim that information about individual cases, revealed in 
litigation, is insufficient for regulation.  While that is certainly true – that 
litigation-based information is not sufficient for regulation – it is also true that 
some litigation-based information may be necessary (or at least very useful) 
for regulators.  Particularly in the regulatory regimes involving corporations 
(MCOs and device manufacturers), tort claims allow the plaintiff to gather 
information about the corporation’s knowledge or intent.  Such information 
might include, for example, proof of a manufacturer’s knowledge of private 
safety and effectiveness studies or proof of an MCO’s explicit corporate policy 
to reject valid claims.187  That information, in turn, might be highly useful to 
administrative regulation (even though it is potentially difficult for judicial 
agents to understand or to act upon such information without additional 
systemic information), and information about corporate knowledge or intent 
might give an agency new cause or new jurisdiction to intervene.188  As an 
 
184 See Gostin, supra note 63, at 2315 (“The tort system has another benefit that is not 
often fully recognized – through the discovery process, it can compel corporations to 
disclose everything they know, or reasonably should know, about the product’s safety and 
effectiveness.”); Robert L. Rabin, Keynote Paper: Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 
GEO. L.J. 2049, 2068-70 (1999) (describing the information-gathering and information-
revealing virtues of tort).  Administrative regulators can then take advantage of that 
information in making later regulatory decisions.  Gostin, supra, at 2315 (“The discovery 
process provides a ‘feedback loop’ to the FDA, which in the past has changed its regulatory 
decisions in light of information revealed in court.”). 
185 For example, tobacco regulation is often cited as an instance in which litigation 
revealed information of corporate abuses, see Gostin, supra note 63, at 2315, but FDA was 
actively investigating those abuses at the same time.  See DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF 
INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY 357-93 (2001) (telling the 
story of FDA’s investigation into tobacco industry intent, leading up to FDA’s assertion of 
jurisdiction over tobacco products in 1997). 
186  See David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s 
Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 492 (2008) (asserting that 
“the information-gathering tools lawyers have in litigation are, by any measure, more 
extensive than the FDA’s”). 
187 The Vioxx litigation is a good example of this function of tort; plaintiffs were able to 
discover, relevantly for FDA, that Merck knew about the heart risks of Vioxx and hid that 
information from FDA during the drug’s approval process. 
188 In the tobacco case, for example, FDA would have jurisdiction over nicotine only if 
the tobacco companies knew that nicotine was addictive and intended to sell tobacco 
products as a drug.  Knowledge and intent were therefore central to FDA’s assertion of 
  
2378 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90: 2323 
 
information-revealing mechanism, therefore, private litigation might serve an 
important function. 
Compensation.  The second benefit of state judicial regulation, particularly 
through tort, is that it provides compensation to injured parties.  (This point is 
irrelevant to the Medicaid story, where the injury is regulatory rather than 
personal.)  Compensation serves two important goals: First, it spreads risk 
among all consumers of the relevant good or service, rather than forcing the 
unlucky few who are injured to bear the full cost of that risk,189 and second, it 
serves non-utilitarian values of social justice and morality, requiring an 
injuring party to make its victims whole.  These values are independent of any 
ex ante regulatory benefit of compensation.  That is, compensation does not 
merely provide an incentive for producers to be careful; it also forces insurers, 
manufacturers, and doctors to spread the risk of error among their consumers 
(through price increases) and to recompense their injured consumers for the 
harms that they cause. 
Experimentation and Responsiveness.  The third and final benefit of state 
judicial regulation is that it has the potential to be experimental with regulatory 
approaches and to be responsive to new regulatory needs.  Both of these values 
are significantly weaker for state judicial regulation than for state executive or 
legislative regulation, but they might nevertheless be present to a certain extent 
in our four stories.   
Experimentation is a known advantage of state control;190 different states 
can try different approaches to Medicaid, ESI, and medical torts, allowing the 
country as a whole to learn from different experiences in different places.  Of 
course, the judiciary is not a coordinated regulator than can engage in self-
conscious experiments the way that a state executive or legislature can, and the 
judiciary has a harder time trying new approaches than the political branches, 
given the path dependence of the common law.  But the possibility for 
variation among the states does provide some opportunity to test the relative 
successes of different approaches. 
The state judiciary might also be better situated than the federal executive to 
respond to new regulatory needs since it is a smaller organ of government that 
is more accessible to affected parties.191  The state judiciary might therefore 
gain information about changing circumstances faster than the federal 
executive.  Again, though, the judiciary’s tie to precedent – the path 
dependence of judicial regulation – might significantly weaken this advantage 
of state regulation in the contexts that are relevant here, all of which center on 
private litigation.  
 
jurisdiction.  See KESSLER, supra note 185, at 355-58. 
189 See Rabin, supra note 184, at 2070-74 (describing the compensation goals of tort and 
their failure in most administrative regimes, but noting that some administrative schemes do 
replicate compensation). 
190 Moncrieff, supra note 4, at 880. 
191 See id.  
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2. Replicating Litigation Values in the Executive 
Perhaps, in light of these values of private litigation, we ought to preserve at 
least some role for the state judiciary in regulating our four stories.  At a 
minimum, the state judiciary could continue to play its compensatory role, 
allowing plaintiffs to file claims in state courts for compensatory damages and 
to conduct full discovery.   
But we need not take it for granted that the values of state judicial regulation 
are better captured in the state judiciary than in the federal executive.  Indeed, 
many of those values can be replicated quite easily in the federal executive and 
might ultimately operate more efficiently in that forum. 
Information Gathering.  As previously noted, agencies already conduct 
investigations when deciding whether and how to regulate, but the tools they 
currently have for that project are insufficient, particularly when compared to 
the tools available to lawyers in discovery.  But surely regulatory agencies can 
be given better tools: greater subpoena powers, perhaps powers to search and 
seize in compliance with the Fourth Amendment, and more money to hire 
investigators.  If given such tools, in fact, agencies might do better than 
lawyers at discovering relevant information since they would have a greater 
scope of “relevancy” than litigators; litigators advocate a single client’s 
interests (or, in the case of a class action, a single group’s interests) while 
agencies represent the collective interest.192  Furthermore, agencies might do a 
better job than litigants of deciding whom to investigate.  Plaintiffs and their 
lawyers have incentives to go after the deepest pockets they can find, 
regardless of whether those actors are the most responsible for creating 
unjustified risks.  Agencies would have no such distortion in their incentives to 
investigate.   
One caveat to this discussion is that litigants don’t just gather the relevant 
information but also serve as whistle-blowers, pointing out the actors (such as 
Medicaid agencies, MCOs, devices, and doctors) that are causing the most 
harm.  Even if they might sometimes sue the wrong party from an efficiency 
standpoint, they still point to products and systems that are causing problems.   
But the executive can set up administrative channels for injured parties to 
serve that same function – and can make it cheaper for injured parties to do so 
– by establishing an administrative claims process.  Such a process would 
require less investment in terms of court filings and fancy lawyers, meaning 
that even parties with small injuries might step forward to blow the whistle – 
something that rarely happens in the high-cost world of tort litigation. 
Compensation.  As with information gathering, there is no reason to think 
that the compensation value of state judicial regulation is unique to that forum; 
administrative agencies can also establish victim compensation funds and can 
allow individual claims for damages.  Indeed, models for this possibility 
already exist for workplace accidents and vaccines.193  Administrative 
 
192 Assuming they aren’t captured.  See supra Part III.B.2.     
193 See Rabin, supra note 184, at 2074. 
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compensation funds naturally serve the risk-spreading goal of compensation, 
whether funded from general revenue or from targeted taxes paid by injurers, 
allowing cost of risk to be spread among the tax base or among consumers of 
the relevant product or service.  And if funded by a targeted tax or if provided 
through claims adjudication by the agency, administrative compensation can 
also serve social justice goals, requiring risk-creators to internalize the cost of 
the injuries they cause. 
Experimentation and Responsiveness.  The experimentation and 
responsiveness advantages of state control are similarly replicable in federal 
agencies.  With respect to experimentation, federal agencies can (and often do, 
particularly in CMS) run demonstration projects to test new policy ideas.  The 
federal agencies, in fact, might run more useful experiments than states since 
they can select populations by statistically relevant criteria (rather than by 
arbitrary state boundaries).  Regulators might also learn better from federal 
demonstration projects than from state judicial experimentation since data 
about such experiments flow to a single entity – the federal agency – rather 
than needing to be conveyed to dispersed state courts. 
As for responsiveness, the state judiciary’s relative advantage is not terribly 
significant given that agencies already have mechanisms by which the public 
can notify regulators of new circumstances, including public comment 
procedures when the agency is actively considering regulatory change and 
petitions for rulemaking when the agency is not actively considering such 
change.  But the agency could create an even cheaper mechanism to gather 
information about changing circumstances and evolving needs by establishing 
administrative adjudication of individual claims.  Through a claims process, 
agencies would receive the same kind of information that the state judiciary 
would get about harmful products or services, and they would receive that 
information just as quickly as the state judicial system.  The federal executive 
might, with such a mechanism, be even more responsive than the state 
judiciary since it would not be path dependent in its regulatory choices. 
3. Improving Executive Regulation 
The final question to consider is what needs to be done to improve the 
federal executive’s regulatory efforts.  Importantly, this Article absolutely is 
not and should not be understood to be an endorsement of the current 
regulatory environment for Medicaid, ESI, devices, or malpractice.  Although I 
have greater faith than some in the capacities of our federal executive 
regulators and although I believe that those regulators have the legal authority 
they need to assert control over the four healthcare regimes I address, I 
certainly do not mean to suggest that the agencies’ status quo efforts are 
sufficient – or even that the status quo agencies are currently capable of 
assuming full regulatory control.  What, then, needs to be done to enable 
exclusive executive regulation of these four regimes? 
The short answer is that we need to give them more money.  The biggest 
barrier to robust federal executive regulation right now is the agencies’ 
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shortage of resources for enforcing their statutes.  To engage in robust 
regulation, the agencies need bigger staffs and more funding.194  Those 
provisions, of course, need to come from Congress. 
The longer answer is that we probably ought to restructure the agencies to 
clarify the agencies’ responsibilities and to signify the importance of the 
regulatory projects at issue here.  All three relevant agencies – CMS for 
Medicaid and malpractice, DOL for ESI, and FDA for devices – have 
structured themselves with different goals in mind, other than the regulatory 
projects at issue here, and they operate in complex regulatory environments in 
which they sometimes compete with other agencies for jurisdiction over single 
healthcare problems.195  PPACA, in fact, has made this problem worse with 
respect to employer-sponsored insurance.196  If we want the federal executive 
to become the exclusive regulator for these regimes, we need to consolidate 
power not only in the executive but also, within the executive, in a single 
department, giving a single agency – probably a single office within a single 
agency – the task of monitoring each of these regimes. 
Furthermore, as noted above, the federal executive should structure itself so 
as to replicate the advantages of state judicial regulation: information 
gathering, individual compensation, experimentation, and responsiveness.  
Each agency ought to establish an administrative claims process that will allow 
injured patients to seek redress for their injuries, and Congress ought to give 
the agencies greater resources and tools for information-gathering. 
These changes to the federal executive regulatory environment would 
require some congressional action, but they would not require substantive 
amendments to the relevant regulatory statutes, all of which already authorize 
administrative regulation.  The move, therefore, should be relatively easy to 
implement and therefore seems well worth the effort. 
 
194 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-581, FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION: FDA FACES CHALLENGES MEETING ITS GROWING MEDICAL PRODUCT 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND SHOULD DEVELOP COMPLETE ESTIMATES OF ITS RESOURCE NEEDS 34 
(2009) (raising concern for the lack of funding and resources devoted to FDA’s medical 
products oversight); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-106, WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROTECTION PROGRAM: BETTER DATA AND IMPROVED OVERSIGHT WOULD HELP ENSURE 
PROGRAM QUALITY AND CONSISTENCY 40-41 (2009) (asserting that the Department of 
Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration lacks funds to fully implement its 
program to investigate whistleblower complaints); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-08-54, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES: INTERNAL CONTROL 
DEFICIENCIES RESULTED IN MILLIONS OF QUESTIONABLE CONTRACT PAYMENTS 45 (2007) 
(finding that CMS neglected to devote sufficient resources to appropriately process contract 
awards). CMS’s response to its oversight deficiencies, the Recovery Audit Contractor 
program, came under a substantial amount of criticism during its initial years.   
195 See, e.g., Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed Health 
Care: The Case for Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 251, 277-81 (1997) 
(observing that six federal agencies have jurisdiction over some aspect of managed care). 
196 See EBSA Unified Agenda, supra note 15. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although the Supreme Court’s and state legislatures’ decisions might be a 
bit premature – predating robust federal executive involvement – the instinct 
they represent is a good one.  Particularly for health law, an area that has a 
long history of administrative regulation, the shift from state judicial regulation 
to federal executive regulation is a wise shift.  At this point in the history of 
health law, we should embrace the reallocation of regulatory authority, 
recognizing healthcare regulation as an aggregate rather than individual project 
and shifting authority to a big-picture regulator.  For that project, federal 
executive agencies are significantly better positioned than state courts. 
 
